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The Russian Revolution of 1917 possesses a paradoxical quality: 
the farther time flows away from those stonny and tragic events, the 
closer attention is paid to them in the West and in Russia itself. The 
revolutionary events of the last seven years connected with the rise 
of Perestroika 'and the collapse of the communist system have made 
analysis of the Revolution of 1917 still more relevant both in 
theoretical and practical aspects because it not only reveals the 
tendencies and inner logic of the current revolution, but also sheds 
light on the seventy-five year old events. In comparing recent 
events to that of 1917, there are notable coincidences which help 
reveal the constancy of. the Russian mentality, and contribute to new 
approaches to the problem of revolutions in general 
and understanding of the Russian Revolution in particular. 
The dull uniformity and over-simplification of the 
interpretations of the Russian Revolution that dominated in the first 
forty years after it in the West (almost all of them negative) and in 
the USSR (all positive) set the stage for discussions and a search for 
alternative approaches in the 1960s and 1970s.l In this respect 
Russia, as usual, fell behind the West and only since the end of the 
1980's, during the period of "Glasnost," have Soviet historians been 
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allowed to discuss freely and honestly their own history and its 
turning point -- the Revolution of 1917. 
The Main Approaches to the Study of the Russian Revolution in 
American Historiography 
In the 1930's and 1940's the leading approach to the Russian 
Revolution in American historiography was most fully expressed m 
the book by William H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution.2 In 
spite of the balanced evaluations, the book suffered from an 
exaggerated focus on the personalities of the mam participants, 
namely Lenin, Trotskii, Kerenskii, Miliukov and others. 
The beginning of the Cold War and the necessity to "know the 
enemy" increased the interest of Western and American historians in 
Soviet studies. The absence of deep and specialized works during the 
previous period re~ulted in the creation of an over simplified model 
explaining the origin and essence of the Soviet socialist system. This 
model, called "totalitarianism", seemed to eliminate the necessity for 
a more specialized analysis of its initial point -- the Revolution of 
1917. The founders of this approach -- Leonard Schapiro, Merle 
Fainsod and Michael Karpovich, stimulated Soviet Studies in America, 
but at the same time they set a narrow approach to the subject, 
stressing the role of politics at the expense of other aspects of 
society .3 The best example of this approach was the book by Robert 
Daniel, Red October.4 
In addition, during the same period of time (the end of the 
1940's - beginning of the 1950's) an attempt was made to 
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"humanize" and rehabilitate the Russian Revolution. Bertram D. 
Wolfe, a former communist and then an enemy of Marxism, created a 
best-selling triple biography of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin.5 Isaac 
Deutcher, a convinced marxist and a veteran of the Trotskyist 
movement attracted public attention by his biographies of Trotsky 
and Stalin. 6 But the biggest achievement of this trend was E.H. 
Carr's monumental The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917 - 1923.7 
In the 1960's Western scholars got access to Soviet libraries 
and archives and revealed new aspects of the Revolution. One of the 
pioneering works was written by Oliver Radkey who thoroughly 
studied the ideology and politics of the Bolsheviks' opponents - the 
Socialist Revolutionaries (SR's), the largest party of revolutionary 
Russia.8 This trend was continued by Rex Wade and William G. 
Rosenberg, both of whom concentrated their attention on Russian 
liberals and shifted emphasis from outstanding personalities to large 
political institutions.9 
In the mid 1960's, a new sociological v1ew of the Russian 
Revolution appeared. The book by Theodore H. Von Laue, Why 
Lenin? Why Stalin? placed the fate of tsarist and revolutionary 
Russia in the comparative context of global modernization .I 0 This 
approach was designed t.o answer quite new questions: what was 
accidental and what was inevitable in the course of the Revolution; 
was there any regularity and historical sense in those events? But 
the modernization theory appeared to be too deterministic and 
abstract for the perception of human activity, freedom of choice, 
responsibility of personality, impact of ideologies. Focus on su.ch 
basic processes as international competition and industrialization 
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obscured the roles of not only emperors and revolutionaries but also 
the differences between landlords and the tsarist bureaucracy and 
between the Bolsheviks and the labor movement. 
Leopold H. Haimson and his successors managed to overcome 
the extremes of the previous trends. In ground-breaking articles 
published in 1964 and 1965, Haimson introduced a social historical 
approach with the focus on social stratification and polarization of 
society which undermined social stability and finally brought Russia 
to revolution and civil war.ll Contrary to Shapiro, who viewed 
Bolsheviks as isolated conspirators and skillful manipulators of the 
working class, and to Von Laue, who didn't see the Bolsheviks' 
influence on the labor movement at all, Haimson, for the first time, 
depicted the workers as independent agents of the Revolution and 
revealed the dynamics of their relationship with the different 
political forces of Russia. Fifteen years later Haimson, together with 
his students, published a collective volume in which this approach 
was applied to rural Russia.1 ~ 
In the following decade the social and structural contradictions 
within tsarist Russia were , examined by two historical sociologists 
who, nevertheless, arrived at quite opposite conclusions. Theda 
Skocpol studied' the negative impact of the political competition 
between the tsarist government and landed aristocracy .13 But 
following Von Laue's thesis, she decided that not the internal social 
conflict, but the war with Germany proved ruinous for Russia. 
Skocpol's structuralistic approach didn't allow her to appreciate the 
role of the workers in the Russian Revolution. 
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This point became a focus of analysis for Tim McDaniel, who 
found the main source of social polarization and revolution in the 
nature of "autocratic capitalism," namely, in the conflict between the 
two goals of the tsarist state - promotion of economic modernization 
on the one hand and maintenance of stability of the autocratic power 
on the other. "Autocracy and capitalism, in their fateful 
interdependence, undermined each other and thus prepared the 
ground for a revolution. against both." 14 McDaniel showed that by 
the beginning of the War the autocratic state had become unable to 
effectively overcome the ruinous consequences of the social and 
economic changes which it had initiated. Thus the War was only the 
final burden that broke the back of tsarism. 
Beginning with the mid 1970's a group of American historians 
started publishing the works where they undertook a comprehensive 
revision of the trarHtional Western view on the Russian Revolution. 
Haimson, who created the whole school, and later Rosenberg 
became the leaders of this trend. The essence of the revision was in 
the transition from a political ·history of the Revolution to a social 
one. This meant that the Revolution is best understood as a 
movement of the broad masses of people whose struggle for their 
interests was relatively independent; and who not only experienced 
influence from above, from ·the political parties, but also themselves 
exerted strong reciprocal influence upon the parties. Such an 
approach demanded a concrete historical sociological study of the 
lower classes in Russia, and also of the labor movement in the period 
of the Revolution. By 1983 there had been published a whole series 
of such works, which allowed Ronald Suny to speak about a new 
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paradigm m the study of the Revolution, the essence of which was 
"the view from below." 15 Due to the works of William Rosenberg, 
Norman Saul, Allan Wildman, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Steve Smith, David 
Mandel, Diane Koenker, Rex Wade and others,16 the lo~~·~·:r classes, 
and especially the working class of Russia, have again occupied the 
central place in the analysis of the Revolution. 
These historians studied different processes within the labor 
movement: self organization into the workers committees, militia 
detachments and soviets; attempts to cooperate with employers and 
their failure; the growth of hostility towards the upper and middle 
classes; increasing radicalism in the workers demands and actions; 
workers' alienation from the moderate socialists and, at last, their 
growmg respect for the Bolsheviks alternative program, resulting in 
mass support for the Bolsheviks. Mandel and Smith distinguished 
three strata of workers -- the politically aware skilled workers, the 
unskilled ones, and the "worker aristocracy", -- and showed their 
different attitude towards economic and political issues. One of the 
main conclusions was that despite the superficial impression of chaos 
and anarchy, workers' actions in 1917 were an essentially rational 
and organized process, 17 and also relatively independent from the 
Bolshevik influence. 
The Study of Menshevism in the U.S. 
Analysis of the labor movement has inevitably led historians to 
the study of the Menshevik party as a political leader and defender 
of workers' interests. By the mid 1980's American historiography 
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had accumulated a large amount of pnmary sources and a number of 
biographies of the Menshevik leaders, which prepared the basis for 
more general historical works.1 8 
Haimson's works in this field again proved to be seminal. In 
1959 he launched the Inter-University Project on the History of the 
Menshevik Movement and became the director of the Project.1 9 
The project was carried out by collaboration between the Menshevik 
emigre community and professional American historians. According 
to Haimson, one ul the Project's immediate aims was to collect and 
preserve the various records of the history of Menshevism. 
Another task was to record the memories of the survivors of 
the Menshevik movement through interviewing them and 
encouraging them to write their memoirs and even the history of 
Menshevism. All these materials have been stored in the Archives of 
the History of Menshevism established at the Harriman Institute at 
Columbia University. The second biggest collection of the documents 
on the Menshevik movement is situated in the Archives of the 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace in Stanford.20 
As a result of this tremendous job several books by prominent 
Mensheviks have been published in Russian and in English during 
the period of 1960 - 1980.2 1 
The main focus of these documents and books about 
Menshevism is that they describe in detail the periods before 
February, 1917 and after October, 1917, leaving the most important 
period -- from February to October - almost totally undeveloped (the 
memoirs of Tseriteli is an exception). 
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In 1983, J.D. Basil published the first book that filled this 
gap.22 Despite its numerous merits, the book turned out to be 
rather superficial; it didn't analyze the full variety of trends within 
Menshevism of that period, the diversity of alternatives that opened 
to the Menshevik leaders at different phases of the Revolution. The 
author failed to show the dramatic ideological struggle within the 
Menshevik party and the dynamics of its relationship with both 
workers and liberals. All this underscores the necessity for further 
research of the Mensheviks' activities during that period. The 
above-mentioned aspects of the history of Menshevism constitute 
the main topics of the present thesis which belongs to the 
"revisionist" ideological trend. 
Soviet Scholars on Menshevism 
A considerable number of books devoted to Menshevism have 
been published in the .U.S.S.R. Most of them emphasize the 
opportunism and revisionism of the Mensheviks, their betrayal of 
the working class interests and· their struggle against the Bolsheviks. 
At the same time this literature adds many interesting facts and 
important documents which allow us to better understand the inner 
logic of the Menshevik policy and the causes of their defeat. 
One of the first works of Soviet historical literature about the 
Mensheviks was the book of V. Bystrianskii, Mensheviki i esery v 
russkoi revoliutsii, (Mensheviks and SR's in the Russian Revolution), 
published in 1922,23 in which the author analyzed the evolution of 
the Menshevik party and characterized it as the mouthpiece of petty 
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bourgeoisie. Much attention was also paid to the counter-
revolutionary activities of the Mensheviks after October, 1917. 
A lengthy book by I. Vardin, Revoliutsia i menshevism, 
(Revolution and Menshevism),24 published in 1925, describes in 
detail the program, tactics and strategy of the Mensheviks in the 
period of the Revolution, and also their deviation from the Marxist 
program principles under the pressure of practical situations and for 
the sake of political expediency. 
The work of I.M. Maiskii, Demokraticheskaia kontrrevoliutsia, 
(Democratic Counter-Revolution)25 is rather interesting because the 
author himself used to be a member of the Central Committee of the 
Menshevik party (though he turned to the Bolsheviks in 1921) and 
was quite aware of his party's activity. Unfortunately, most of the 
book is devoted to the post-October period, especially to the history 
of the Czecho-~'/'Vak revolt and the creation of the Samara 
Constituent Government under the leadership of the Mensheviks and 
SR's. 
The most interesting and "objective" work was a four volume 
account by G. Shliapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, (The Year of 
Seventeen)26 which, though written from a Bolshevik position, is 
rich in facts and data about Menshevik activity in the Petrograd 
Soviet. It also reveals the complicated and changing relationships 
between the two Social-Democratic parties of Russia and their fight 
for the working masses. 
During the period from 1930 to 1950 the amount of work 
about the Mensheviks greatly decreased, firstly due to the 
disappearance of this party from the political arena and secondly 
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because of the dramatic narrowing of the officially allowed topics 
and interpretations. Only in the very beginning of the 1930's was it 
still possible to publish a few books containing valuable facts; that of 
I. Mints, Mensheviki i interventy, (The Mensheviks and 
Interventionists) 2 7 and P. Lepeshinsky, Mensheviki , 
(The Mensheviks).2 8 
New opportunities for the study of Menshivism were opened in 
the 1960's after the Twentieth and Twenty-second Congresses of the 
CPSU. The policy of destalinization enabled the publication of 
numerous documents and archived materials which greatly increased 
the primary resource base for the research.2 9 
Thus, M.V. Spiridonov in his book Politicheskii krakh 
menshevikov i eserov v professionalnom dvizhenii, (Political Failure 
of the Mensheviks and SR's in the Tradeunionist Movement), 
published In 7 3 0 depicted fo:r the first time Menshevik 
activities in the trade unions. Spiridonov presented a rich 
historiographic essay of this topic, making use of new archival and 
documentary resources. He made an attempt to make serious 
generalizations and conclusions (of course, from the orthodox-marxist 
point of view) about the causes of the Mensheviks' loss of influence 
in the trade unions and in the labor movement as a whole. 
During the same year a big monograph was published by V. V. 
Komin, Bankrotstvo Burzhuaznykh i melkoburzhuaznykh partii Rossii 
v period podgotovki i pobedy Oktiabrskoi revoliutsii, (The 
Bankruptcy of Bourgeois and Petty Bourgeois Parties in Russia in the 
Period of Preparation and Victory of the October Revolution).31 It is 
seen from the title that the author analyzed the whole spectrum of 
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political parties, with the exception of the Bolsheviks, and therefore, 
in spite of the large volume of the book, the Mensheviks are given 
only slight attention. The author displayed a deep knowledge of 
Menshevik primary sources and Western historiography. He 
undertook a serious attempt to understand the Mensheviks "from the 
inside," proceeding from their statements and their situation, and not 
from the point of view of Bolshevik values. This approach drew a lot 
of criticism to the author for his "underestimation" of the role of the 
Bolsheviks in the disclosure of the Mensheviks inefficiency. 
This "underestimation" was "corrected" in the book by N.V. 
Ruban, Oktiabrskaya revoliutsia i krakh menshevisma, (The October 
Revolution and the Collapse of Menshevism).32 This book seems to 
be the only one in the postwar Soviet historiography which is fully 
devoted to the Mensheviks in their most critical period of March 
1917 through the summer of 1918. Despite the use of numerous 
primary sources, the book suffers from excessive tendentiousness. 
The author interprets Menshevism as one of the trends of right 
reformism m the European socialist movement and tries to prove 
(according to Lenin's directions) the inevitability of the Mensheviks' 
betrayal of the working class and, in the long run, their slipping into 
open counter-revolution. In the author's opinion, such behavior 
under the conditions of revolution in Russia doomed the Mensheviks 
to ideological and political collapse. 
The only interesting study produced in the 1970s which 
described the struggle between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks 
was the book by H.M. Astrakhan, Bolsheviki i ikh politicheskie 
12 
protivniki v 1917 godu, (The Bolsheviks and Their Political 
Antagonists in 1917).3 3 
A new approach to the problem is represented in a collective 
monograph, Neproletarskie partii Rossii: urok istorii, (Nonproletarian 
Parties of Russia: the Lesson of History), published in 1984,34 where 
the authors drew a wide historical perspective of the evolution of all 
the main Russian political parties (except the Bolsheviks), starting 
with the very beginning of the twentieth century, and ending with 
their elimination after the Civil War. Such comparative analysis, 
which has revealed the different reactions of various parties to the 
same events, and the change of their strategies and tactics under 
changing conditions, has been undertaken in the Soviet Union for the 
first time. Inspite of Marxist-Leninist phraseology, this approach has 
produced very interesting material. Naturally, the main conclusion 
of the authors of this monograph was that the Bolshevik victory and 
the failure of their antagonists were inevitable. 
Sources 
The main sources for the study of Menshevism in 1917 are the 
newspapers of that time and, first of all, the Menshevik central organ 
Rabochaya gazeta, (The Worker's Newspaper).35 The second 
important newspaper is the official mouthpiece of the Petrograd 
Soviet, which was under Menshevik control until September, 1917: 
Izestia Petrogradskogo Soveta rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov, 
(The News of the Petrograd Soviet of the Workers and Soldiers 
Deputies).3 6 The third important source is Protokoly zasedanii 
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Jspolnitelnogo komiteta Petrogradskogo Soveta, (The Minutes of the 
Executive Committee of the Petro grad Soviet Meetings)3 7 which 
reveals inner, often hidden, disagreements among the Menshevik 
leaders and the detailed reasoning behind their political decisions. 
A collection of documents in six volumes, Revoliutsia 1917 
goda: Khronika sobytii, (The Revolution of 1917: The Chronicle of 
Events) 3 8 is especially useful for the reconstruction of the 
comprehensive picture of the development of the Revolution. 
Most significant documents of the Revolution in English 
translation are gathered in a three volume edition by R.P. Browder 
and A.F. Kerensky, The Russian Provisional Government.3 9 
Since the Mensheviks in 1917 were very closely connected 
with the activity of the Soviets, two collections of documents called 
Vserossiiskoye soveshchanie Sovetov, (All-Russian Conference of the 
Soviets )40 and Vtoroi Vserossiiskii Siezd Sovetov, (The S."c:ond All-
Russian Congress of the Soviets)41 were used as additional sources. 
The analysis of the labor movement and its attitude towards 
the Mensheviks was undertaken on the basis of the many-volumed 
edition Revoliutsionnoye dvizhenie v Rossii, (Revolutionary 
Movement in Russia)42. 
The situation in the army was reconstructed according to the 
documents from the book Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v russkoi armii 
v 1917 g. 27 fevralia 24 oktiabria. Sbornik dokumentov, 
(Revolutionary Movement in the Russian Army in 1917. February 27 
- October 24. The Collection of Documents).43 
The second group of sources consists of the memoirs and 
historical accounts of the Mensheviks themselves: I.Y. Tsereteli, V.S. 
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Voitinskii, N.N. Sukhanov (who was formally affiliated with the 
Independent Internationalists but was practically a Menshevik), O.A. 
Ermanskii, F.I. Dan, Iu. Martov and others.44 
No less valuable information is contained in the memoirs and 
"histories" of the Mensheviks' opponents and allies: P.N. Miliukov, 
V.V. Shulgin, A.Y. Shliapnikov, A.F. Kerensky, V. Chernov and V.B. 
Stankevich. 45 
The secondary sources, both by Soviet and American authors, 
were also of great help, especially those belonging to the revisionist 
trend. 
Themes and Problems 
One of the basic conclusions which can be derived from the 
works of the revisionist trend is that before the Bolsheviks seized 
power the Mensheviks had already lost it. It was significant that 
Kerensky was unable to find even three hundred armed men in the 
entire capital city to defend himself and his government during the 
October coup. If that is true, the center of the attention should be 
shifted from the Bolsheviks to the Coalition Provisional Government 
(which combined the representatives of liberal bourgeoisie and 
moderate socialists) and to the allied Soviets. An important and 
sometimes decisive role in both ruling bodies was played by the 
Mensheviks, more exactly, the faction that called itself Revolutionary 
Defensists. Hence, one of the key topics in the study of the 
Revolution of 1917 is the strategy and tactics of the Mensheviks, 
their relationships with allies and antagonists, and especially with 
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their social support and constituency -- the workers who finally 
turned away from the Mensheviks. 
The first question that arises here is: why did the Mensheviks 
lose the game? Until July they possessed powerful authority among 
wide masses of workers, peasants, soldiers and the democratic 
intelligentsia. They held decisive control over levers of state power 
(enjoying the support of the Petrograd garrison and the majority in 
the army). They made use of their enormous opportunities for oral 
and printed propaganda among the masses. They had a reasonable 
program for evolutionary and necessary social and economic reforms 
(the only program which might have saved Russia from civil war). 
They had competent and pragmatic leaders. Why, with all this, did 
the Mensheviks lose? And not only did they lose power, but also 
opened the door for civil war and dictatorship, against which they 
had been fighting so hard. This question is the fundamental one for 
the present research. 
The next question 1s whether the Menshevik leaders had a real 
chance to prevent the Civil War and dictatorship (it doesn't matter 
which type -- right or left)? If such a chance existed why was it 
lost? And what role did the Mensheviks play in it? Could they have 
at least partly preserved support from the right and above (from 
liberals and propertied classes) as well as from the left and below 
(from the Internationalists and workers), and used this support to 
avert the catastrophe of the Civil War? The author of this research is 
convinced that this was not a realistic possibility. The works of "the 
revisionists", which revealed the growing polarization of the society, 
the growth of interclass hatred, the inefficiency of the government, 
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and the Mensheviks' inability to satisfy the urgent needs of masses, 
support this conclusion. 
Questions about the mistakes and responsibilities of any 
political group in Russia (and the Mensheviks, in particular) should 
be considered within the "right dictatorship" or "left dictatorship", 
with the inevitability of Civil War in either case. The author is 
convinced that a right dictatorship would have also led to the Civil 
War, which in Russia at that time could possibly have resulted not 
only in restoration of the old regime but also in victory of the 
proletariat and the Bolsheviks). This second alternative -- a right or 
left dictatorship -- is clear for us now, in retrospect, but was not at 
all obvious to the politicians of that time (at least before the 
Kornilov's revolt ofAugust 27 - 30). Therefore, all attempts of the 
Mensheviks to preserve the Coalition and maintain civil peace before 
August, 1917 can b(' justified. · If those attempts failed, it was not 
the guilt of the Mensheviks, who had made considerable concessions 
to the liberals. Guilt lies with their right and left rivals: the 
bourgeoisie and landlords, on the one hand, greedily seeking new 
foreign lands and monopolistic superprofits and undivided power; 
and radical SR's, anarchists and Bolsheviks, on the other hand. One 
should also consider the guilt, or more exactly. the tragic misfortune 
of Russian peasants and workers who could not respect personal 
rights, the rights for property and the sovereignty of law. 
Already on the eve of Kornilov's revolt (and especially after it) 
the situation dramatically changed and talks about civil and class 
peace and cooperation by that time reflected self-deception. At that 
very moment the Mensheviks made their most serious and fatal 
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mistake: instead of allowing a terrible, but still lesser evil -- the 
right dictatorship, they blocked the way to it, thus giving the way to 
the left, Bolshevik dictatorship, which in its destructive consequences 
has exceeded the worst possible predictions. 
This paper does not pretend to provide a comprehensive 
examination of the foregoing hypothesis. The activity of the 
Mensheviks (and their centrist leaders -- Revolutionary Defensists) 
constituted only one aspect of revolutionary events, but even this 
aspect is too large and complicated to be fully analyzed within the 
limits of the Master's Thesis. Therefore, the direct and closest 
subject of this work is the origin, evolution and collapse of the 
Menshevik idea and policy of coalition with the liberals. Special 
attention is also paid to the ideological struggle inside the Menshevik 
party itself on the key political issues, and to the social and economic 
causes of the Mer:"heviks' failure. The analysed period is limited 
by only eight months: February 28 October 25 -- the day where 
the Mensheviks obtained power till the day they lost it. 
CHAPTER II 
THE "HONEYMOON" OF THE REVOLUTION 
The Necessity for Dual Power 
The February Revolution was a surprise for all political parties 
of Russia. But still bigger surprise became its political result, which 
came to be known as "dual power." Thus the main question of the 
present chapter is whether the "dual power" was accidental or it was 
inevitable. And if it was a necessity, ·what were the reasons and the 
rationale for it? 
Despite a traditional view that dual power was dictated by the 
Mensheviks' doctrine, and also their fear of power and responsibility, 
the facts show that the Mensheviks turned very creative In 
combining their ideological principles and the practical needs of the 
moment. Moreover, the strategy they finally agreed on not only was 
appropriate to the balance of political forces but also was responsive 
to the strongest sentiments of most workers and soldiers, whom the 
moderate socialists pretended to lead. 
The first meeting of the Petrograd Soviet late on the night of 
February 27 demonstrated the extreme uncertainty about the 
revolution's victory. Accounts of different witnesses and participants 
convey the deep anxiety created by the complete disorganization of 
those hundreds of thousands of excited but inexperienced 
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"revolutionaries" who looked on the members of the executive 
committee as their leaders. In Steklov's words: 
We had not yet succeeded in formulating any 
political program for the movement and at the same time 
learned that the (tsarist) ministers were still free. There 
were rumors that five regiments were marching on us 
from the north. From minute to minute we expected that 
they would arrive and if not shoot us, take us away .1 
In spite of the chaos and the lack of information, the 
Mensheviks' leaders, from the first days, tried to evaluate the real 
scale, significance, meaning and perspectives of the events. 
Naturally, they compared it to the already familiar experience of the 
Revolution of 1905 - 1907. On March 2, an editorial in the soviet's 
newspaper warned its readers: 
"The lesson of 1905, not to surrender oneself to illusions and 
not to overestimate the revolutionary forces. "2 Later, Menshevik 
Ermanskii also drew parallels with 1905, pointing out that a 
"revolution in times of military defeat may win an easy victory m 
the short run but may still be crushed in the long run. "3 Very soon 
the Mensheviks noticed the fact that what had begun as a workers' 
revolution had won its victory as a "soldiers revolution" -- that is, 
only the support of the soldiers had ensured the victory. Still 
further, as Ermanskii observed, this fact brought to the foreground 
the question of the peasantry and its "cultural and political 
backwardness."4 No Menshevik -- whether Internationalist or 
Defensist could envision the peasant-soldiers as a decisive 
participant of social and political relations, let alone accept them as 
trusted allies of the working class. In addition, the armed, hungry, 
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and homeless masses of soldiers represented a real threat to the 
efforts of the executive committee in organizing and feeding its 
supporters. In these circumstances, as Sukhanov explained later, the 
attention of the committee was turned from "high politics" to 
"technical questions." 5 
Indeed, the earliest actions of the executive committee in the 
face of perceived threats· to itself and the revolution made it the 
"organizational center of Democracy," around which the masses were 
called to organize.6 The process of "self-determination" of masses 
seeking for leaders to legitimize their revolt was crucial to the 
evolution of the soviet's political strategy. The "revolutionary forces" 
imposed on the executive committee the problems of two kinds: 
those which demanded cooperation with the Duma committee, and 
those which forced to confront it. 
The self-appointed temporary executive committee had 
already . taken steps on the afternoon of February 27 (even before 
the soviet's plenum had met for the first time) to deal with the two 
most pressing needs: defense and provisions. It had nominated the 
Mensheviks Volkov, V.G. Groman~ and Frankorusskii t0. 1 supply 
commission, and it had called on S.D. Mstislavskii, an army officer 
with SR-Internationalist leanings, to come to the Tauride Palace, the 
headquarters of the Soviets, to organize its defense.7 
At the second plenum meeting on February 28 the Soviet 
decided that its military and supply commissions should work 
independently of the corresponding commissions established by the 
Duma committee, although keeping in contact with them.8 But very 
soon it became evident that the problem of supplying food for the 
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population of the capital clearly required close cooperation with the 
Duma committee. Alone, the soviet's supply commission could 
neither guarantee the cooperation of railroad personnel in shipping 
food to Petrograd nor gain access to whatever reserves were still in 
the city. The Duma committee controlled the railroad's telegraphic 
service therefore capable of declaring itself the principal power, who 
could thus control the movement of supplies (and troops) to 
Petrograd.9 Of no less importance was the pressure from the Central 
Cooperative of Wholesale Buyers in Petrograd, which offered its 
services to the Soviet but then demanded that the soviet's supply 
commission be merged with its Duma counterpart. On February 28, 
the Soviet did reverse its earlier decision and established a common 
supply commission with the Duma committee. 1 0 
On the major issue of the military defense of the Revolution 
and the question of the army's loyalty, matters were far more 
complicated, though here too, cooperation seemed unavoidable. The 
balance of forces in the country at large favored the Duma 
committee,11 which controlled the movement of troops on the 
railroads leading to the capital. More than than, only the Duma 
committee could claim the loyalty of the tsar's generals in command 
of the army on the front. Reassured by the Duma's expressed 
concern for maintaining order and continuing the war effort, the 
fronts' commanders urged Gen. N. Iu. Ivanov to stop his attack on 
Petrograd and, on March 2, also recommend the tsar's abdication. I 2 
The support of the Duma committee prevented a civil conflict and 
strengthened the moderate and left wing of the revolution. The 
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army's acceptance of the Duma committee, imposed on the soviet's 
leadership the imperative of cooperation. 
The Duma committee also held the key to the support of the 
officers of the Petrograd garrison, which numbered some 180,000 
men. Signals of loyalty to the Duma on the part of the officers were 
coming in from everywhere.13 It was essential for the Soviet to 
"neutralize" the officers and obtain their cooperation, for only they 
could organize the soldiery into units capable of defense or at least 
prevent the army's anarchy .14 Therefore, the first manifesto to the 
soldiers, issued on February 28 by the executive committee 
underlined the authority of the officers or the Duma, though in fact 
its purpose was to resist Rodzianko's attempts to establish the 
Duma's command over the soldiery -- his "Order to the Troops" that 
they obey their officers. The soviet's manifesto declared: 
The executive committee of the Soviet of Worlr(:rs' 
Deputies does not recommend that soldiers n.:, , . ; to 
preserve their regular organization or refuse to obey the 
orders of the military commission (of the Duma) and its 
officials. At the same time, it advises all military units to 
immediately elect representatives to the soviet . . . for the 
establishment of one, united will for all of the . . . working 
class.15 · 
The restrained language of this document stands in striking 
contrast to the soviet's second appeal to the soldiers, the Order No. 1, 
issued just one day later. The events surrounding the creation of 
these two documents were indicative of the changing pressures on 
the executive committee as well as of the leadership's quick response 
to the challenge from its growing constituency, particularly that of 
the ideologically mistrusted soldiery. 
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Between February 28 and March 1, a new problem arose, as 
soldiers in one unit after another refused to allow the return of their 
officers even after the latter had declared their support for the 
revolution. In effect, the soldiers were declaring that they would no 
longer tolerate the relationship of unquestioning obedience that had 
existed between officer . and soldier under the old regime.16 This 
challenge from the soldiers' barracks (rather than the workers' 
quarters) allowed the executive committee to abandon its emphasis 
on cooperation in favor of open defiance of the Duma committee. 
The first soldiers' deputies appeared at the soviet plenum on 
March 1, and they took the floor immediately to voice their 
grievances. One soldier began: 
Was it for this that we have made the revolution? 
For the State Duma to again seat the officers on our 
shoulders? Now that we have our soviet, and we all 
realize that in all our units, too, we should intrcH~~ICe 
committees to manage supplies, let's allow these 
committees to also watch over the officers.l 7 
After soldiers had ·finished speaking, Sokolov made a draft of 
the resolution, which was immediately adopted. It stated for the 
first time the principle of a conditional acceptance of authority: "The 
soldiers' masses (will obey) the Soviet· of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies. The opinion of the military organization (i.e., the military 
commission of the Duma) will be accepted only to the extent that it 
does not conflict (with the guidance of the Soviet).l 8 
In spite of the apparent discrepancy between this resolution 
and the position taken by the executive committee in its manifesto of 
the night before, the committee raised no significant objection to 
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another resolution, brought before it by a deputation of ten soldiers. 
Instead, the committee entrusted this deputation with the final 
working out of an order (prikaz) that the Soviet was to issue to the 
soldiers of the Petrograd garrison. This Order No. 1 was thus the 
creation of the soldiers themselves but enjoyed the full sanction of 
the executive committee. The order consisted of three main points: 
the civil equality of soldiers and officers; a separate self-
administration for the soldiers in all but purely military matters 
(that is, administration of the unit's daily life by elected committees 
and of political matters by the soldiers' representatives to the 
soviet); and the conditioning of the soldiers' loyalty to the Duma 
committee and to the officers on fulfillment of the first two points.19 
The demands of the soldiers bore a remarkable resemblance to 
those the workers soon started to send to the soviet. In its handling 
of these demands the executive committee showed itself ready to 
respond to the needs and aspirations of those groups that were its 
natural constituency, and to represent them before the Duma 
committee. In return, the soldiers, whose political loyalty had been 
sought by the Duma committee, now began to ally themselves with 
the soviet.20 Suddenly, the leaders of the executive committee 
perceived that the Soviet possessed genuine authority. But what 
would be the formal division of political authority between the soviet 
and the Duma committee? 
The practical question, then, was how to preserve the young, 
fragile revolution as well as to expand and deepen it. On this point, 
there was full agreement between the Internationalists (both 
Mensheviks and Independents) and all other Mensheviks in the 
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executive committee: namely, that the organizationally weak and 
politically isolated "camp of democracy" had to establish an alliance 
with the "bourgeois camp," because "state agencies, the army, the 
zemstvos, and the cities . . . might obey (the Kadet) Miliukov, (but) 
they would not obey (the Menshevik) Chkheidze," and also because, 
on most issues, though not on that of the war, the bourgeois camp 
could be pressured into more accommodating positions. For these 
reasons, Sukhanov argued, Democracy would initially have to yield 
power to its "class enemy," but the soviet, as the organization of the 
revolutionary masses, should preserve the "fullest freedom of 
struggle" against these enemies.21 
At the March 1 meeting, Sukhanov brought up another element 
in his scheme for the first time: namely, a formula for conditional 
support of the Provisional Government. 
Three ever.:·· heightened the Menshevik leaders' sense of 
power and led them to use it as leverage over the new government. 
The first of these was the soldiers' appearance (in the midst of the 
executive committee's discussion . of the question of power late on the 
night of March 1) to ask the committee's support for what would 
later become Order No. 1. The second was the report of the 
negotiators sent by the executive committee to the Duma committee 
on the night between March 1 and 2. Three of the four negotiators 
were Internationalists -- Sukhanov, Steklov, and Sokolov (Chkneidze 
was the fourth). Surprisingly, they met almost no opposition to their 
demands. "Our program," Steklov later recalled, "was accepted by 
everybody as being unquestionable and unavoidable. "22 Finally, 
there was the incident on March 2, just before the soviet's final 
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discussion of the question of power when a large crowd assembled 
in the Tauride Palace reacted with hostility to a speech by Miliukov 
defending the monarchy. Sukhanov and Steklov were reassured by 
the apparent belief of the crowd that "democracy was within reach of 
a republican structure and a solution to the land question."23 Thus, 
the "logic of events" helped the Internationalist SDs to convince the 
more ambivalent Mensheviks to make their support of the 
government conditional. 
All Russian socialists, began from the assumption that Russia 
was finally going through its "bourgeois revolution." Disagreements 
and uncertainty concerned three interrelated issues: the length of 
the period before the socialist transformation could be attempted; 
the extent to which social change was possible during the transitional 
phase; and the roles of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat during this 
transition. Different answers were given to these questions by 
different groups of Mensheviks according to their preferred areas of 
activity and the ideological conceptions they had developed in the 
past. Yet by all accounts, the Mensheviks in the executive committee 
responded m unity to the question of power, especially on the 
socialist participation in government. The Mensheviks and 
Independents alike found their expectations altered and had to 
accept the notion that, in the present revolution -- because of 
society's division into upper and lower strata, the presence of the 
soldiers among the latter group, and the declared loyalty of the 
soldiers to the soviet -- the soviet, an essentially working-class 
institution, had to assume a greater and more precisely defined 
responsibility for the course of the bourgeois revolution than 
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Menshevik-Marxist doctrine seemed to allow. In time, the 
differences between the Internationalists, the Independents, and the 
more moderate Mensheviks would become apparent, but for the 
moment, the executive committee of the soviet appeared unified in 
its support of the political solution of "dual power." 
The Essence and Structure of Dual Power 
In the historiography of the revolution of 1917, the term "dual 
power" (dvoivlast') usually refers to the division of political authority 
that existed in different forms between the Provisional Government 
and the Soviet Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies between February 
and October. Here, however, the term will be used to denote the 
specific political agreement that was concluded on March 2 between 
the executive committee of the Petrograd soviet and the temporary 
committee of the State Duma. The agreement was published in the 
form of joint statements: one by the Provisional Government, which 
listed its program of promised reforms; the other by the soviet, 
which called on the masses to "lend support" to the new government" 
as long as . . . it fulfilled these obligations and struggles resolutely 
against it (remnants of) the old regime. "24 The eight points of the 
Provisional Government's program guaranteed civil and political 
equality for all as well as complete freedom of political activity. 
Except for the particular case of Kerenskii, there was to be no 
participation by the soviet in the government, nor were any 
institutional ties established between the two bodies. The ministers 
of the Provisional Government were drawn from the parties and the 
public organizations of liberal, propertied, and "loyal" Russia.25 The 
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essence of dual power was a division of authority and responsibility 
between the two contending social and political forces. As such, it 
reflected their mutual recognition that the balance of forces made it 
impossible for either the Duma or the soviet to establish by itself the 
political order that was to replace the tsarist regime. While the 
March 2 agreement granted all formal state authority to the liberal 
bourgeoisie, this did not indicate surrender on the part of democracy 
or its abdication of its right to influence the course of the 
revolution.26 The socialists of the executive committee refused to 
participate in the cabinet in order to secure the soviet's existence as 
a separate entity, as well as its right to engage in the work of 
organizing its followers into a united political force. The dual power 
would not have worked, nor would it have been morally valid, if it 
had not corresponded to the attitudes of the workers and soldiers on 
whose support the '.-wiet's authority and strength rested. 
The text of the dual power agreement was submitted to the 
plenum of the soviet for ratification of March 2. Its authors found 
reassurance in the results of the vote as well as in the general thrust 
of the discussion. Only ten out of some four hundred deputies 
present voted against the resolution proposed by the executive 
committee, and only nineteen voted for the Bolshevik-sponsored 
counterrevolution, which called on the soviet to support a 
"Revolutionary Provisional Government" rather than the existing 
"anti people" Provisional Government. At the same time, the 
Bolsheviks' insistence on the "three-tail" minimum program of Social 
Democracy (the eight-hour workday, confiscation of the gentry's 
land, and a democratic republic) was met with "stormy applause."2 7 
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This showed that the deputies support rested on the belief that the 
leaders were dedicated to the realization of the social and political 
changes symbolized in the "three-tail" program. At the same time 
the workers, distrusting the Provisional Government, decided to take 
responsibility for the essential aspects of their lives and to ensure 
their freedom to do so. Meetings held on March 2 in the 
Rozhdestvenskii district and at some factories created their own food 
committees and workers' militias in addition to electing delegates to 
the soviet.28 The resolution adopted on March 5 by the workers of 
the Second military equipment factory said: 
The Provisional Government that emerged from the 
revolution speaks for the interests of the bourgeoisie, and 
therefore the working class can support this government 
only insofar as (postol'ku, poskol'ku) its policy will not 
run against the interests of the broad toiling masses. At 
the same time, the working class must organize itself for 
the defense its class interests and the consolidation of 
all the achievements of the revolutions.2 9 
Dual power provided not only a formula that captured these 
diverse feelings -- insecurity, suspicion, the desire for equality -- but 
also a framework within which both workers and leaders might 
acquire political experience while avoiding responsibilities for which 
they felt themselves unready. Much of the success of dual power 
and of the February revolution itself would depend on the ability of 
the Mensheviks in the executive committee to organize their 
followers into a powerful and disciplined force. To accomplish this, 
the leaders had to ensure that the masses' most pressing demands 
and aspirations were fulfilled. They had to keep pressure on the 
country's new rulers and yet prevent the pressure from below from 
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destroying the delicate political arrangement that had been worked 
out between the soviet and the Provisional Government. 
The war became the source of a crisis which the leaders of the 
soviet would confront throughout the summer and fall of 1917 and 
also the reason for the unexpected political influence of the peasant-
soldier on the outcome of the revolution. Moreover, the soldiers' 
centrality in the revolution would necessarily affect the balance of 
forces between the camps of the revolution and thus the relations 
between the soviet and the Provisional Government.3 0 Social 
Democrats in the soviet would have to overcome their reservations 
about servmg as leaders of the soldier~. Although the garrison's 
revolt had guaranteed the victory of the workers' demonstrations in 
February, most Social Democrats still expected the peasant-soldiers 
to act in future as the revolution's reactionary wing.3 1 
In spite of the soviet,'s consent on March 1 to be a leader of the 
Petrograd garrison, the executive committee had responded with 
anxiety to the subsequent news of widespread disobedience and 
violence against officers in the army on the front and in the navy .3 2 
Fearing that the army might turn into a mob, the executive 
committee agreed with Minister of War Guchkov and the army's 
commanders on the necessity of restoring discipline in the armed 
forces.3 3 At the same time, the executive committee demanded that 
the new government of "free Russia" begin a fundamental change in 
the structure of relations in the army, though it suspected that these 
changes would not go unchallenged.3 4 To complicate matters 
further, the soviet's discussions of the disturbances in the naval 
bases of Kronstadt and Helsinki placed the executive committee 
31 
under menacmg pressure from the soldiers. At a meeting of the 
soviet on March 6, the full force of the soldiers' rebellion against the 
officers' authority became clear for the first time.3 5 
After Sukhanov had spoken, in opposition to the soldiers' 
demands that they be allowed to elect their officers, a soldier 
blocked his way from the rostrum back to his seat and brandished 
his fist as he screamed with rage about "gentlemen who had never 
been in a soldier's skin." Like other Social Democrats, Sukhanov 
feared that the soviet would be taken over by these "impenetrable 
muzhiks in their grey overcoats. "3 6 The dilemma confronting the 
executive committee was how to satisfy the soldiers' demands and at 
the same time restrain them and persuade them to accept the need 
for discipline.3 7 
During the first days of the dual-power arrangement, the 
response of the e~~ecutive committee to these conflicting pressures 
was quick, self-assured, and unprovocative. On March 6, the 
committee issued Order No., 2 to the Petro grad garrison, confirming 
the basic stipulations of Order No. 1 but adding a new formulation 
that allowed the soldiers' committees "to object to the appointment of 
any officer" while the soviet continued to consider the more radical 
demand for elected officers.38 The executive committee also named 
a delegation that was to demand of Guchkov that he add his 
signature to Order No. 2, accept the principle of election of officers, 
and institute reforms in the army along the lines set forth in Order 
Nos. 1 and 2.3 9 
On the advice of the generals who were known to be 
sympathetic to the soviet the executive committee issued Order No. 
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3, to the soldiers on the front. 4 0 This order explained that the 
preceding orders had been meant only for Petrograd and promised 
the immediate implementation of new rules for the army at large. In 
the meantime, it called on soldiers and officers to show each other 
mutual respect. 41 In return for this last pronouncement, Guchkov 
had to agree to the prompt reforms in soldier-officer relations.4 2 
While this compromise was being negotiated, the executive 
committee decided to establish control over the army in Petrograd, 
and eventually elsewhere, in the form of commissars to be 
dispatched to all units.4 3 
The soviet had forced the government to grant soldiers some 
basic civil rights and had claimed for itself the right to control over 
the military and had further declared itself the political leader of the 
soldiers m Petrograd and their autonomous committees. When 
guchkov wrote go Gen. M.V. Alekseev on March 9 that the 
government "did not have any real power over the Petrograd 
garrison," he was not merely playing the pessimist; the soldier's 
committees in the capital had declared that they would instruct 
soldiers not to obey any orders that had not been approved by the 
soviet.44 
But the Mensheviks' success in early March was not a 
guarantee either of the army command's continued cooperation in 
democratizing the army or of the soldiers' support for future policies 
of the soviet, especially of the soldiers at the front. The first sign of 
continuing problems was Guchkov's resistance to the soviet's 
initiatives on military reform. For example, he refused to sight a 
Declaration of Soldiers' Rights which had been drafted by the soviet 
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in consultation with his own commission on military rules, and he 
encouraged the commanders on the front to take a similar stance.4 5 
The issue here was not only the commanders' authority or the 
battleworthiness of the army though Guchkov regarded both of 
these issues as very important -- but the duality of power itself. The 
Issue of the war and the fear of defeat were exploited in a public 
campaign which the bourgeois forces launched against the soviet in 
mid-March. Statements by the government, declarations from the 
Duma, newspaper reports quoting the commanders on the front, and 
editorials in the nonsocialist press all warned of immediate military 
danger, and these warnings were given force by the defeat of the 
Russian forces at Stokhod on March 22. 
Until the middle of March, the only tension between the 
soldiers and the executive committee involving the war had 
concerned the reluctance of units of the Petrograd garrison to serve 
on the front, where they would be beyond the soviet's protection of 
their new rights and of course exposed to the dangers of combat. 4 6 
But the soldiers as a whole, especially those on the front, neither had 
formed a clear view of what the revolution meant for the execution 
of the war nor were they aware of the soviet's differences with the 
Provisional Government on this point.4 7 Most soldiers were not 
enthusiastic about fighting as such, and those on the front often 
argued that they had done their duty and it was now someone else's 
turn (be it a worker or a soldier of the rear garrison); they expected 
the revolution to bring about immediate victory, peace, and 
demobilization. 48 Moreover, in contrast to the soldiers' revolt 
against military authority in Petrograd -- and the the soviet's swift 
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response to it~ which had had the effect of forming a bond of loyalty 
between the garrison and the soviet -- the revolution had taken a 
different path on the front. There, officers had usually been rejected 
when suspected of pro-German or pro-tsarist sentiment; the soldiers' 
committees had quickly been recognized by the command~ in an 
effort to both restrain them and integrate them into the existing 
structure of authority; and the officers of "democratic" social origins 
and of non-commissioned rank (many of them Menshevik Defensists) 
exerted the greatest influence in the soldiers' committees~ helping to 
articulate a mood of patriotism based on the premise that a "new 
nation" had been born of the revolution.49 For these reasons~ 
soldiers on the front were slow to turn against the war. Beginning 
around the middle of March, the court of the Tauride Palace became 
the scene of many demonstrations staged by military units 
proclaiming "The !'reservation of Freedom Means Victory over 
Wilhelm." On March 16, the soldiers of the Guards' Reserve Artillery 
Battalion promised to sacrifice themselves for the Provisional 
Government, and on March 17, the Izmailov Regiment called for the 
continuation of the war to victory, while the Guards' Petrograd 
Regiment appeared with banners declaring "War for Freedom," 
"Soldiers to the Trenches," "Workers to the Benches," and "Confidence 
in the Provisional Government."50 Such demonstrations were seen 
daily at the Tauride Palace for the next two weeks, but in the last 
week of March, following the defeat in Stokhod, the slogans suddenly 
became hostile to the workers and the soviet. On March 27, a 
meeting of delegates from the front called on workers to work 
overtime, and a meeting of eighty-nine of Petrograd's garrison units 
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demanded that workers forsake the eight-hour workday. On March 
28, a deputation from the First Army (59 officers and 145 soldiers) 
pleaded with the soviet to strengthen its solidarity with the 
Provisional Government in order to ensure military victory .51 At 
one point, Skobelev, who was by no means an Internationalist, was 
nearly lynched by the soldiers for expressing reservations about the 
war.5 2 
This fact was both encouraged and exploited by the Duma 
deputies touring the front, as well as by the nonsocialist press, which 
channeled the soldiers' vague misgivings against the soviet and 
especially against the workers' demands.53 For a while, it seemed to 
the Social Democrats on the executive committee as if the bourgeois 
camp would succeed in turning the soldiers against the workers, the 
soviet, and dual power and altering the balance of forces between 
the two camps 0f the revolution. Mistrust of the soldiers had made 
these Social Democrats slow to recognize the shakiness of the 
progovernment mood in the army. But, once the soldiers had come 
face to face with the workers, heard their complaints, and taken note 
of the divisions between the soviet and the Provisional Government, 
they invariably sided with "democracy."54 Nevertheless, the initial 
uncertainty about the army's loyalty kept the soviet and the 
Provisional Government m mutual dependence, and prolonged the 
dual-power arrangement. 
Establishing of the Revolutionary Defensist Policy 
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Long before the February insurrection, the Mensheviks were 
divided on the war issue into four major groups. At one extreme 
stood Plekhanov's faction. It had abandoned the revolutionary 
effort, at least for the duration of the war, and worked for the defeat 
of the Central Powers. It stood beyond the bounds occupied by most 
Mensheviks; in this respect Plekhanov did indeed separate himself 
from other Menshevik groups. A step to the left of Plekhanov stood 
the self-defensists whose best known spokesman was Potresov. His 
faction encouraged socialists to support defensive warfare and all 
military measures designed to protect Russian borders. To the left of 
Potresov stood moderate Zimmerwaldists. They were prepared to 
participate in the Russian War Industry Committees (a form of 
defensism), but at the smae time called for a socialist peace m 
Europe. To the far left stood the extreme Zimmerwaldists. Their 
principle figure was Julius Martov who opposed all military 
measures and all financial or political shcemes that might result in 
continuing military action. He spoke only of concluding a universal 
socialist peace in Europe. On the eve of the revolution most 
Mensheviks were to be found supporting either Potresov's point of 
view or that of the more moderate Zimmerwaldists. 
The realities of the ~evolution opened before the Mensheviks 
new opportunities for solving the problem of war. Many foreign 
policy issues that had ,divided the party were now obviously gone, 
and the chief problem was how to reconcile the different factions and 
views and to present a uniform Soviet policy. Something had to be 
done in a hurry because the Provisional Government was already 
informing the Allies of Russia's official position. On March 3 two 
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Menshevik factions -- moderate Zimmerwaldists and Self-defensists 
-- held the meeting where Potresov demanded that the Soviet 
Executive Committee support a policy of defense of the revolution 
against foreign aggression, while at the same time the moderate 
Zimmerwaldists (especially Ermansky) demanded that Potresov and 
his friends support the socialist· peace slogans. Common ground was 
found when Potresov dropped his objections to the peace aims and 
the moderate Zimmerwaldists agreed to accept the policy of 
defense.55 The two formally antagonistic groups found unity by 
adding the defense measures advocated by the moderate 
Zimmerwaldists. In the second week of March these views were 
officially accepted by the Petrograd Soviet and on March 14 they 
were . published in Izvestiia as "An appeal to the Peoples of the 
World."56 
The appeal served the ground for both peace and defense. It 
called on the masses of Europe to unite their effort for immediate 
conclusion of peace and it accused the "bourgeois" governments of 
Europe m rousing international hostilities. The sentiments in the 
Appeal were put forth in strong language: "Refuse to serve as an 
instrument of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, 
landowners, and bankers and by our united efforts we will stop 
this horrible butchery that is a stain on humanity " At the same 
time, however, the Appeal went beyond a simple restatement of the 
peace sentiments found in the Zimmerwald Manifesto. The Manifesto 
(accepted by most Mensheviks before 1917) spoke only of peace and 
of the evils of imperialism, but the Soviet Appeal of March 14 
expressed a determination "to defend the Russian revolution from 
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foreign military force . "57 The appeal, hence, warned that the 
Petrograd Soviet was not led by pacifists. Rabochaia Gazeta echoed 
that "the revolution was a victory over tsarism, but if it is not 
victorious over the war -- all its forces will have fought in vain." But 
the same author assured readers that "the voice of the revolution 
will defend its freedom with arms in hand. n5 8 
The strong statement in favor of defending the revolution could 
draw fire from extreme leftists who would be quick to compare the 
soviet foreign policy with the right wing defensist positions occupied 
by Plekhanov and the German Social Democrat, Phillipp 
Scheidemann." In order to prevent such accusation Sukhanov wrote: 
Our policy of defense is defense of a proletarian 
character. It is not defense of the country, not defense of 
a nation. This defense is of freedom, defense of the 
revolution from conquest by reaction.5 9 
The soviet leaders tried to emphasize the gap that separated 
the Petrograd Soviet from the Allied powers and from the bourgeois 
Provisional Government in Russia. When the Soviet leaders reached 
an agreement among themselves and fortified their new stand 
against criticism from the left, they got into confrontation with Paul 
Miliukov, a foreign minister of the Provisional Government. 
Miliukov was convinced that peace in Europe and the survival of his 
government depended on an Allied military victory over the Central 
powers. Miliukov asked his countrymen to endure the wartime 
conditions until the defeat of Germany. 
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On March 4, 1917, Miliukov wrote to the Russian diplomatic 
representatives abroad, giving instructions to his staff. He outlined 
the Provisional Government's position in foreign affiars: 
We will strictly observe the international 
obligations contracted by the fallen regime. We shall 
steadfastly strengthen the relations which bind us to the 
Allied nations . . . The government of which I am a 
member will devote all its energy to the achievement of 
victory. 6 0 
The 'Menshevik leaders and their Social Revolutionary allies in 
the Petrograd Soviet could not agree to the position taken by 
Miliukov, and began a propaganda campaign against the government. 
Miliukov would have to bring his policy in line with Soviet thinking. 
Rabochaia Gazeta led the charge. "What does Miliukov really want," 
the editor asked rhetorically. "By saying that we must destroy the 
Turkish state, he really wants us to march on Constantinople and 
rename it Tsargrad; and by freeing the people of Austria-Hungary, 
he means the annexation of Galicia . . These desires, which are not 
in step with the will of the people, constitute the real goals of 
Miliukov Finally, the editor asked for a guarantee that 
Miliukov would steer Russia toward the Zimmerwald goal of a 
general European peace without annexations and indemnities.6 2 
Miliukov, in turn, attacked his critics in editorial articles that 
appeared in Rech, the Kadet newspaper in Petrograd, and intensified 
government efforts to capture the loyalty of the soldiers in the 
Petrograd barracks. The activity among the soldiers was especially 
threatening to the Soviet leaders. By the third week in March a 
serious confrontation between the Soviet and the government was 
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unavoidable, and the Soviet leaders began to consider using the 
garrison in a public demonstration against the Provisional 
Government. On March 21, Sukhanov proposed that "the Soviet 
begin a nationwide, systematic campaign for peace and mobilize the 
proletariat and the garrison under the slogans of peace." 6 3 
Sukhanov's call for action met little resistance until the leader of the 
Siberian Zimmerwaldists, Iraklii Tsereteli, who had just returned 
from exile, rose to address a meeting of the Soviet Executive 
Committee in the late afternoon of March 21. The Georgian 
Menshevik spoke out in opposition to Sukhanov's plans. His polemic 
ignored Sukhanov, but questioned the manner in which the Soviet 
leadership was conducting its relations with the Provisional 
Government. Tsereteli charged the Soviet leaders with disturbing 
I 
the political harmony that had to be maintained between the Soviet 
and the Government: "We ought to refrain from politically 
irresponsible opposition." Tsereteli did not try to alter the 
Zimmerwaldist-defense posture adopted in the March 14 Appeal to 
the Peoples of All the World, but he expressed fear that radical 
action would endanger the safety of the new "bourgeois' regime. The 
Mensheviks wished to achieve a socialist peace in Europe (on that 
point agreement could be reached), but outward hostility toward the 
Provisional Government would endanger political harmony. Plans to 
change the foreign policy of the Provisional Government had to be 
carried out with caution. Tsereteli wanted the Executive Committee 
of the Soviet to assure the survival of "that unity of progressive 
forces which were created for the solution of internal problems. "6 4 
He reminded the Mensheviks of their commitment to the strategy of 
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socialist-liberal cooperation during the revolutionary period. 
Tsereteli felt that uncontrolled street demonstrations and 
propaganda assaults on the Provisional Government would further 
divide the socialists from the liberals and dim hopes for defending 
the refolution against internal as well as external enemies. 
According to Tsereteli, the action recommended by Sukhanov would 
weaken the stability of the Provisional Government and expose all 
the revolutionary forces to defeat. A week after his confrontation 
with Sukhanov, Tsereteli spoke at the All-Russian Conference of 
Soviets. He touched on a number of issues including the relationship 
between the Soviet and the Provisional Government: 
At the very moment, comrades, when the Soviet of 
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies announces that it is 
entering into a conflict with the Provisional Government 
and it turns out that one part of the people is supporting 
the Soviets while the other part is supp::.;,: 7 ' ·z the 
Provisional Government, then at that moment our 
national cause will be lost. 6 5 
After the March 21 speech against Sukhanov, tsereteli 
managed to consolidate his power in both the Executive Committee of 
the Petrograd Soviet and in the Menshevik party. The left Petrograd 
Mensheviks were willing to accept him, showing no sign of 
resistance. O.A. Ermansky and V. bazarov, for example, were avowed 
Zimmerwaldists who had opposed cooperation between socialists and 
liberals in the Russian War Industry Committees, but in March of 
1917 they accepted the leadership of Tsereteli and were prepared to 
support his views among other Mensheviks in Petro grad. 6 6 
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Tsereteli's leadership was also acknowledged by the Menshevik 
Self-defensists who promoted the views of Potresov and Gvozdev. 
They saw a the protection of Russian frontiers as an essential factor 
in the salvation of the revolution. They stood to the right of 
Tsereteli, however. in their skepticism about the plans to establish a 
socialist peace m Europe and on several occasions advised the 
majority in the Menshevik party to make certain that peace plans 
not be allowed to threaten good relations between the Soviet and the 
Provisional Government. 6 7 
The Menshviks who stood closest to Tsereteli during 1917 were 
identified with neither the Self-defensists nor the radical 
Zimmerwaldists. N.S. Chkheidze, F. Dan, and B.I. Gorev (Gol'dman) 
were the most important. These men represented the center of 
Menshevik opinion during most of 1917. Before the revolution 
Chkheidze led the Menshevik faction in the Russian State Duma. He 
was a cautious political leader who remained as far away as possible 
from the inter-party feuds of the pre-revolutionary period. Gorev 
had been numbered among the radical Zimmerwaldists before the 
insurrection in Petrograd. He was a professional journalist who 
helped Tsereteli by serving on the editorial board of Rabochaia 
Gazeta. Dan was much closer to Martov than to Tsereteli in his 
private affairs, but he worked with Tsereteli in Siberia during the 
early war years and became attached to the Georgian leader. After 
Tsereteli's downfall, Dan rejoined Martov's group. He, apologized for 
his stand taken in 1917 and eventually became an important figure 
in the left wing of the Menshevik emigration. 
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Tsereteli's support from Social Democrats extended beyond the 
Menshevik party. The Bundist leader Mark Liber spoke on behalf of 
Tsereteli in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. The 
Jewish Bund formally entered the Menshevik party at the May 
conference of Mensheviks. Tsereteli also captured the loyalty of 
some Bolsheviks. Both V.S. Voitinsky and P.N. Sevruk (Gomel) joined 
the Menshevik party in March as supporters of Tsereteli. 6 8 Of 
course, the reunion of all Bolsheviks and Mensheviks that Tsereteli 
hoped to achieve did not come about, but in the spring of 1917 many 
Bolsheviks were reserved in their opposition to the Soviet leadership; 
it was not until after Lenin's influence over the Bolsheviks grew 
strong in the summer of 1917 that the Bolshevik party became a 
strong foe of the Petrograd Soviet. 
One of Tsereteli's most impressive gains in March of 1917 was 
to capture the support of some important leaders in the Social 
Revolutionary Party. The loyalty of the soldiers to the Social 
Revolutionary party did not run deeply, but so long as it existed the 
Soviet could speak with a strong voice by gaining the support of 
Social Revolutionaries, Tsereteli was able to rely, at least temporarily, 
on the armed garrison in the capital city which gave the lvienshevik 
leaders an authority that fat outweighed their slight numerical 
strength. The close friendship between Tsereteli and some important 
Social Revolutionary leaders, especially V. Zenzinov and A. Gots, was 
well known. 
Conclusions about the consolidation of Tsereteli's power over 
the Mensheviks and over other socialist groups in Petrograd must be 
drawn cautiously. The Mensheviks themselves did not unite closely 
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around Tsereteli. They still remained tied in small groups that owed 
loyalty only to a tactic or to an idea and not to the new party leader 
or to a unified party structure. As long as these groups agreed to 
work together, Tsereteli could serve as party spokesman simply 
because his v1ews coincided with theirs. But once the small 
Menshevik groups began to disagree .on how to support the 
Provisional Government and how to conduct foreign policy, Tsereteli 
would find his support quickly weakening. The same unwritten 
agreements kept the Social Revolutionaries united and attached to 
the Mensheviks. 
Tsereteli's victory of March 21 reduced Sukhanov's influence in 
the Executive Committee, but it had no effect whatever o.n Miliukov 
whose foreign policy remained unchanged. Miliukov still saw the 
direction of Russia's war effort as the business of the Provisional 
Government and the Allied chiefs of state, and he boldly continued 
his efforts to capture the . loyalty of the troops in the Petrograd 
garnson. Moreover, he considered the Soviet leaders to be the 
representatives of a small minority of the Russian people, and hoped 
their political influence would wane as time passed. .. ,, ; " foreign 
policy statement of March 6 followed closely the line he revealed in 
his March 4 memorandum. And on both March 9 and 11 he quietly 
accepted political recognition on behalf of the Russian Provisional 
Government by the various Allied powers whose support was 
continuing on Miliukov's readiness to continue the fighting. The 
Soviet leaders were not pleased with Miliukov's stand, and were 
expecting Tsereteli to initiate action. He began in late March by 
preparing a formal statement of Soviet policy. It included 
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statements favorable to both the defense of the revolution from 
foreign invaders and the establishment of an international peace. It 
also called upon the Provisional Government to renounce all 
aggressive designs and to repudiate annexations and indemnities. 
Supposedly written in the spirit of Zimmerwald, the program was a 
long way from Miliukov's position. 6 9 It met with a favorable 
reception in the Soviet on Friday, March 24 (Sukhanov voted in its 
favor) and was then presented to the Provisional Government by the 
Contact Commission, the Menshevik-dominated committee 
established on March 7 to serve as the liaison body between the 
Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government. 
After some considerable haggling back and forth between the 
government and the Soviet, Miliukov made the following statement 
on March 27: "Defense is not the sole, but the primary aim of the 
war, and there wnl be no violent seizure of foreign ter:; 1 (,1 •• ,,, "7 0 
Tsereteli happily accepted this version of Miliukov's foreign 
policy as did most other socialists in the Executive Committee of the 
Soviet. It was considered by them to be a concession on the part of 
the Provisional Government, "a step away from the foreign policy of 
the tsarist regime, a step toward peace. n7 1 
The publication of the March 27 declaration on war aims is 
usually interpreted as a victory for the Petrograd Soviet, but it is 
difficult to understand why this interpretation has not been 
challenged. The declaration showed little resemblance to the views 
of the Menshevik leaders in the Soviet. By making no direct 
statement about extending Russia's boundary lines and avoiding use 
of the terms annexations and indemnities, the foreign minister was 
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obviously rejecting the Menshevik demands in a clever fashion. In 
addition, the style of the new pledge suggested that Miliukov had not 
refused from his desire to achieve peace through a military victory 
over the Central powers. He simply stated most of his former aims 
without using the popular jargon of the times. It was true that the 
Provisional Government had taken a step away from the tsarist 
position, a retreat the Mensheviks hoped to turn into a full scale rout, 
but the temporary victory hardly outweighed the serious 
implications that arose from the document accepted on March 27 by 
the Soviet Zimmerwaldists. As a matter of fact, acceptance brought 
about the Soviet recognition of several points in the policy that 
Miliukov was advocating. 7 2 But unforseen complications were to 
develop that were not anticipated by either defensists or 
internationalists. 
CHAPTER III 
TilE APRIL CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The First Clash 
The late March - early April was a relatively peaceful time 
which inspired optimism among all ranks of society. The truce in the 
factories held up. Production was increasing in many plants, and 
though Lenin's return to Petro grad on April 4 a~;:·· '··2 rise to 
anxiety about the "danger on the left," this was calmed down by the 
record of workers' resolutions published in the socialist press, which 
seemed to indicate that few workers were ready to embrace Lenin's 
slogan of "All Power to the Soviets."l Moreover, the soldiers, who 
had only recently threatened the leaders of the soviet politically and 
even physically, now began to issue declarations of loyalty. 
By mid-April, the executive committee and the soviet had 
become more efficient instruments, under the leadership of Tsereteli 
and the group of old friends who now held important positions in 
either the soviet or the Menshevik and SRs organizations. Every 
morning, this leadership group would meet in Skobelev's apartment 
to go through the day's agenda, to draft resolutions to be presented 
to the executive committee for approval, to outline its positions in 
negotiations with the Provisional Government, and to debate 
required changes m strategy.2 Although the members of this 
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informal "presidium" came from different parties and factions, they 
were characterized by a more practical approach to the situation 
than that taken by other, more doctrinaire socialists. Above all, 
these practical politicians appreciated the importance of a strong, 
unified leadership, and their unity as well as their control of the 
soviet's two largest factions enabled them to predetermine all the 
major political decisions of the executive committee and the 
Petrograd soviet. 
First in importance was Tsereteli -- by then the most popular 
man in the soviet, its current theoretician, and its chief negotiator 
with the Provisional Government. Then, m descending order of 
importance, were three former collaborators of Tsereteli in the 
Siberian Zimmerwaldist group: Dan, the chief editor of Isvestia; 
Voitinskii, the soviet's best troubleshooter m dealing with workers 
and soldiers; anrl Gots, the group's liaison with the SR party. 
Chkheidze and Skobelev, both of whom had been, like Tsereteli, 
Duma deputies from the Caucasus. On the periphery were four other 
Siberian Zimmerwaldists who were the members of the executive 
committee and of the Menshevik organization: N.A. Rozhkov, and 
three Menshevik praktiki, V .A. Anisimov, S.L.Vainshtein, and K.M. 
Ermolaev. Sometimes the "presidium1s" meetings would be joined by 
Gvozdov, Bogdanov, or Liber as well as by a few populists: V.M. 
Chernov, the SR leader who had returned from Europe in early April, 
or N.D. Avksent'ev, a right-wing SR who served as chairman of the 
Soviet of Peasants. Together, these men could reasonably claim to 
embody the unity of the three constituent groups of "democracy" 
(workers, soldiers, and peasants), and for this reason throughout 
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most of April the discipline they sought to enforce on the soviet did 
not cause tension between leaders and followers. The biggest success 
of the soviet in this time was the turn in the soldiers' loyalty to the 
soviet. 
There were several reasons for this change in the soldiers' 
position. First, the soviet's public stand on defense now reassured 
the soldiers that they would not be betrayed by a defeatist 
leadership. Second, the government's seeming acceptance of the 
slogan of a "democratic peace" gave an aura of national acceptability 
to the soldiers' desire for a prompt end to the war. Third, the crisis 
of late March had forced the executive committee to improve its lines 
of communication with the soldiery through its commissars, the 
soldiers' committees, and daily discussions with delegations from the 
front. Finally, and perhaps most decisive, was the course of the 
confrontation between soldiers from the front and the Petrograd 
workers. The workers' restraint had the effect of undermining the 
soldiers' belief in the bourgeois press's stories about the workers' 
"excessive" demands, so that the numerous delegations sent from the 
front to report on events in the capital returned from their visits to 
the factories expressing sympathy for the harsh conditions in which 
the workers had long been forced to live and for their demands, as 
well as appreciation of the workers' expressed readiness to continue 
serving the war effort.3 
The favorable effect of these developments seemed to be 
confirmed when the new leadership sent its highest-ranking 
members to the First Congress of the Western Front, held in Minsk 
from April 7 to April 16. Not only did the congress adopt the 
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resolutions on war and state power passed by the Conference of 
Soviets and demand that the Provisional Government grant financial 
support to the Petrograd soviet, but the soldiers also expressed 
unqualified support for an eight-hour workday. 4 Addressing the 
congress, Tsereteli assured the soldiers that "such unity among all 
elements of Russia" had never existed before.5 
The soviet's contacts with the Provisional Government were 
successful during the first half of the month, though the war issue 
itself remained intractable. The soviet demanded that the 
government restate in clearer language than was the case in its 
"Declaration to the Russian People" (March 27) a renunciation of 
annexations and indemnities, and Miliukov agreed to this demand. 
However, he did not act on it immediately, even though he was 
under pressure to do so from within the cabinet. 6 
By mid-April soviet leaders had found a new weapon with 
which to pressure the government: the Freedom Loan. This loan had 
been proposed by the government to help meet the costs of the war 
and of the new social programs, but it was not popular among 
workers, who believed such expenses should be covered by 
increased taxation of the rich, especially of the infamous and much 
rumored "war profits. "7 Responding to the workers' opinion, most 
Mensheviks (especially Chkheidze) objected to Tsereteli's favorable 
presentation of the loan on the issuance of Miliukov's promised 
diplomatic note. 8 It was in this context that the three thousand 
deputies of the soviet were informed about Miliukov's promise and 
about Tsereteli's trust in its fulfillment. 
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On April 18, as all of Petrograd was celebrating May Day, 
Miliukov finally sent the promised note to the Allies, but it was 
hardly what Tsereteli had anticipated. It was merely an addition to 
the text of the former "Declaration," which, in fact, negated the 
latter's very essence: It promised that Russia would continue the 
war to a "decisive victory" and together with the other "leading 
democracies" establish "guarantees and sanctions" terms 
suspiciously reminiscent of the objectionable "annexations and 
indemnities." To make matters worse, in the soviet's view, the entire 
cabinet (including Nekrasov, Tereshchenko, and Kerenskii) had 
approved the offending document.9 
Being distressed by the note, the executive committee spend 
the night of April 19 discussing it. Tsereteli declared that this act 
"had destroyed the compromise that had mad cooperation with the 
government possible." 1 0 
In spite of the general indignation, however, the executive 
committee could not agree on any course of action. The three leading 
Zimmerwaldists (Tsereteli, Dan, and Gots) recommended quiet 
negotiations with the government. But most of the old leaders such 
as Bogdanov, insisted on calling on the workers and soldiers to 
demonstrate against the government's declaration.! I In any case, 
events on the streets, beyond the con~rol of the leadership, did not 
allow this crisis to subside peacefully. 
Having been alerted by earlier discussions in the soviet of their 
leaders' position on the question of the war, as well as of Miliukov's 
promtse, and having found out m the morning papers of April 20 
that the promise had in effect been violated, thousands of workers 
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and soldiers came out to demonstrate, not against the government as 
such but against its refusal to accept the demand of the soviet. I 2 
By the second day of the protest, April 21, the mood of the 
demonstrators had changed. A sense of betrayed trust and a 
renewed belligerency seemed apparent, perhaps as the result of a 
counterdemonstration organized by the Kadet Central Committee and 
attended by thousands of well-to-do citizens, intelligenty, and 
shopkeepers, who had come out to defend "their government" and 
repel its attackers. The city was suddenly divided, and many 
workers -- such as those of the Putilov plant for example, who had 
previously heeded their leaders' advice to stay off the streets --
could no longer avoid taking sides in this social and political 
confrontation.13 
The committee's bureau immediately resolved to appeal to the 
masses of the c1ty, through the socialist press and through the 
committee's most popular speakers (who were dispatched to 
factories and military units), to avoid demonstrations that were not 
authorized by the soviet. The point was not that the leaders 
disagreed with the political goal of the demonstrators (though a 
conflict between a radicalized constituency and its moderate 
leadership did appear later). Rather, the Revolutionary Defensists 
were once again concerned with avoiding an unorganized, "anarchic" 
display of force and were quite realistically fearful that an open 
attack on the government would further undermine its already 
shaky authority and provoke violent clashes in the streets. For this 
reason, when, on April 21, news arrived of just such clashes and of 
Kornilov's order to the troops to come to the defense of the 
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government, the executive committee, at Skobelev's behest, issued a 
"proclamation" to the troops which forbade them to follow any 
government order without the soviet's sanction -- an open challenge 
to the government's authority. At the same time, however, the full 
soviet accepted Dan's proposal to ban all demonstrations in Petrograd 
for two days, and in this way the leadership indicated its right to 
censure its constituency .1 4 
Thus the soviet leadership was likely to act as the country's 
self-appointed authority, fully conscious of national responsibility. 
This had been and continued to be the essence of its policy of 
restraint, as Stankevich put it very clearly in a speech to the full 
soviet on the evening of April 20: 
Why, comrades, do we need 'action'? At whom will 
we shoot? Against whom shall we employ our forces? 
After all, the only forces are you and the masses behind 
you . . . . Whatever you decide, will be . . . .Look, it is five 
minutes to seven; we will call them on the phone and 
within five minutes the government will hand over its 
authority. By seven o'clock (the government) will no 
longer exist. Fore, action, and civil war -- why do we 
need this?l 5 
This April crisis wa:s eventually resolved through negotiations 
between the executive committee and the Provisional Government in 
a nightlong session. Tsereteli and Nekrasov, the two men who 
personified the intelligentsia's mission to unite and lead Russia's 
"vital forces," composed a short text in which annexations were again 
repudiated and the offending terms "guarantees" and "sanctions" 
were explained as being references to international tribunals, 
limitations on armaments, etc.l6 Later that evening the plenum of 
54 
the soviet (where 2,000 votes were registered) almost unanimously 
accepted the compromise as a "great achievement for democracy."17 
Moreover, the next day the same body overwhelmingly approved the 
presidium's proposal to lend its support to the Freedom Loan. 
The soviet's new measure of confidence and prestige did not 
immediately lead to a new political strategy, however. In at least 
three of their public pronouncements, the Revolutionary Defensists 
argues neither that dual power should be abandoned nor that a 
coalition government should be established. Tsereteli simply 
reasserted that the "vital forces of the nation could and must march 
together again. n} 8 
In the days following the April crisis, a striking contrast 
developed between the Mensheviks' reaction to it and that of the 
non-Menshevik circles in the soviet and the partisans of democracy 
outside the soviet. The events of April 20 and 21 had aroused a 
widespread desire for a formal expression of unity, especially among 
those intermediary social and political groups that hoped to prevent 
the polarization of society. Intelligentsia organizations, locally 
elected governments, soldiers' and officers' organizations, and 
peasant soviets all appealed to the Petrograd soviet and the 
Provisional Government to form a coalitions. Accordingly, the 
cabinet of the Provisional Government called on the soviet to add its 
"active and creative force," to the "responsible work" of government 
and hinted at the cabinet's weakness. I 9 
The April crisis had demonstrated that a change in the soldiers' 
loyalties had deprived the Provisional Government of the single most 
important instrument of governmental authority. Even inside the 
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soviet, many who had previously been content to practice 
cooperation within the framework of dual power were moved by 
their concern for both a sound structure of governmental authority 
and the continuation of the war effort to the demand for coalition. 
The SRs had been propagating this idea with considerable success in 
the garrison's barracks for some time, and now they made it part of 
their party's official strategy.2 0 
The Menshevik leadership, however, held firmly to its rejection 
of coalition. In a series of meeting between April 21 and 25, the 
party's Petrograd organization, its district committees, the 
organizational committee, and the editorial board of Rabochaia gazeta 
all agreed that the pressure for coalition had to be resisted.2 1 
Toward that end, Dan drafted a resolution summarizing the 
Menshevik view on coalition. It was the fullest Menshevik statement 
to date on the subject, a list of the expected detrimental effects of 
coalition: 
1. -The soviet . . . will lose all its influence and the ability 
to lead the masses. 
2. -The responsibility for all social conflicts inevitable m 
the course of the revolution will fall on the socialist 
members of the government . . . As members of a 
government facing revolutionary elements (stikhiia), 
they will be in objective opposition to the (masses). 
3. -(Coalition) will strengthen ... social maximalism and 
give credence to the illusion that extremist demands 
may be fulfilled (and) will increase anar chy on the 
left. 
4. -(Coalition) will tie the soviet to the government and 
will destroy the role of the soviet as the organ of 
revolutionary democracy that exercises kontrol' over 
the government; it will undermine the revolutionary 
stature of the soviet and will turn it into a regular 
governmental department. 
5. -(Coalition) will create an extremely unstable situation 
... and could cause an unavoidable collapse of the 
government, the result of which will lead either to a 
victory of the counterrevolutionary forces or to a 
dictatorship of the proletariat that would be doomed 
to defeat at this time.2 2 
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Indeed, over the next few months he would see his prophecies 
realized in almost every detail. The Menshevik leaders searched 
desperately for a way to both strengthen the authority of the 
cabinet and gain greater leverage over its work even as they rejected 
a formal coalition. During the meeting of April 28, Chkheidze 
proposed that the SRs -- as the party of the peasantry and the urban 
petty bourgeoisie -- join the government. When Gots refused, 
Tsereteli suggested that nonparty "democratic elements" sympathetic 
to the soviet join the government and be assured that democracy 
would support them.2 3 
The effort, however, was doomed from the start, for as L'vov 
made clear to Tsereteli that evening, what the ministers actually 
wanted was for the soviet to renounce the formula of conditional 
support and so give up its separate power, its separate authority.2 4 
Three days later, the government formally turned down Tsereteli's 
proposal. Meanwhile, the leaders of the executive committee did all 
they could to lend the government some of the soviet's strength. A 
resolution to support the Freedom Loan (April 22) was one such act. 
The executive committee searched also for ways of restoring 
discipline in the garrison .. 
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The committee published an announcement on April 26 that 
not only acknowledged General Kornilov's authority but did not 
demand implementation of the promised plan of reorganization and 
hid the conflict that had surrounded Kornilov's order to mobilize the 
troops against the demonstrators on April 21. It was a measure of 
the soldier's disaffection from the government that even after the 
publication of this statement some units refused to obey Kornilov's 
orders without the authorization of the executive committee, 
precipitating his resignation on April 30.2 5 
Aware of the futility of most of their efforts to help the 
government regain its hold on the situation yet unable to pursue any 
other course, the Revolutionary Defensists leaders turned to the 
constituency of the soviets and to the population at large with a 
series of appeals published between April 30 and May 2. There 
were appeals to the peasants to market their grain and not to seize 
land before a Constituent Assembly had had. a change to discuss the 
problem. Another appeal, drafted by Voitinskii, was addressed to 
the soldiers and went beyond any earlier commitment of the soviet's 
leadership to the continuation of the war. It declared that there 
were times "when only offensive action can repel, or prevent, an 
attack by the enemy. "2 6 
The soviet leaders were afraid that the governments weakness, 
its inability to enlist the support of the broadest segments of 
population in the execution of its most essential functions, posed an 
imminent danger to the revolution. On April 29, Guchkov announced 
his resignation from the post of minister of war, citing th threat of 
anarchy, especially in the army, as his reason. Immediately, the 
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soviet was flooded with telegrams from soldiers' committees and 
personal appeals from officers sympathetic to democracy that it join 
the government to prevent the further disintegration of the army. 
Tsereteli remembered it as the moment when he concluded that it 
was "necessary to give the country a new government (and) not to 
delay by even one minute. "2 8 
Guchkov's resignation hastened two political developments: a 
division within the first cabinet of the Provisional Government, and 
the emergence of a "counterrevolution" -- that is, an organized 
political opposition to the soviet and to the processes of 
democratization. The right wing in the cabinet headed by Miliukov 
and Gchkov made clear their belief that the cabinet alone spoke for 
Russia's national interests, whereas the soviet was merely a 
"partisan" institution not deserving of special influence over state 
policy .29 At the same time, it also became clear that there were men 
in the cabinet, and in Miliukov's Kadet party, who were, in 
Rosenberg's words, "ready and willing to work closely with a broad 
spectrum of political leaders."3 0 These men were left Kadet 
Necrasov and three other cabinet ministers who shared his 
receptiveness to collaboration with the moderate socialists: 
Konovalov, an old ally from the public organizations; Kerenskii, the 
popular Trudovik who was fond of describing himself as 
"democracy's hostage' in the government; and Tereshchenko, the 
nonparty "repentant capitalist," as N abokov called him.3 1 
To be sure, Konovalov, Kekrasov, and Tereshchenko shared the 
cabinet's principal concern that the erosion of political authority 
might render the government powerless. But they sought to 
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overcome what they saw as the harmful effect of dual power not 
through confrontation with the soviet but through co-opting its 
moderate leaders into the cabinet. 
The April crisis had sharpened disagreements in the cabinet. 
Whereas Miliukov and Shingarev had been ready to consider 
Guchkov's proposal to suppress the demonstrations by force and 
thereby break the soviet's strength -- if troops could have been 
found to carry this out -- Tereshchenko had announced that he 
would rather resign than authorize such bloodshed.3 2 As the first 
step toward mobilizing the forces of the right against the soviet and 
its supporters, Guchkov had attempted to revive the Duma and its 
Provisional Committee.33 Moreover, at a meeting of the members of 
all four dumas which the Provisional Committee convened on April 
27, ostensibly to commemorate the convocation of the First Duma, 
Guchkov attacked th~ sov~et in the strongest words.3 4 
Yet, as Tsereteli had emphasized in his speech to the Duma's 
commemorative meeting, for every attacker the soviet had a 
bourgeois defender. If Rodzianko rejected the soviet's kontrol' of the 
government, Nekrasov stressed that "the goal of the Russian 
revolution was not to replace one autocrat with twelve"; where 
Shul'gin's sights were fixed on the war, Prince L'vov saw the 
revolution's legacy of freedom. 3 5 
Guchkov's resignation marked the crystallization of the 
antidemocratic or even counterrevolutionary forces as well as their 
departure from the Provisional Government. When news of the 
resignation reached the soviet's presidium during its morning 
meeting on May 1, together with an invitation to Tsereteli to discuss 
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the new situation with Prince L'vov, Tsereteli and his colleagues 
agreed to accept coalition if no other solution to the political crisis 
could be found.3 6 Ideology had apparently finally given way to 
reality or at least to the reality perceived by the Revolutionary 
Defensist leaders through their experience in the executive 
committee. 
Menshevik Debates on Coalition 
The final vote for a coalition with the Provisional Government 
took place at a meeting of the executive committee in the early 
morning of May 2. There were forty-four voices in favor of coalition, 
and nineteen against it. The majority realized that Coalition was to 
save the soviet from the far less acceptable alternative of 
establishing its own "soviet" government.3 7 (Prince L'vov had 
presented Tsereteli this alternative, obviously effectively, in the 
form of an ultimatum on May 1.) 
Independent Internationalists and the Mensheviks within the 
committee had again in a political arrangement, though their reasons 
for doing so as well as their interpretations of it were markedly 
different. In the days immediately following its May 2 decision, the 
executive committee was faced with two conceptions of the coalition 
strategy. The first, proposed by Tsereteli, emphasized cooperation 
between democracy and the progressive bourgeoisie in fulfilling the 
promises of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. This conception 
called "minimalist," included three principles: that the socialists 
should constitute only a minority of the cabinet; that they should 
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limit their programmatic "conditions" to the issues of war and peace; 
and that the soviet should declare full confidence m the 
government.38 The second conception was worked out by 
Independent Internationalists, especially Sukhanov and B azarov, 
who hoped coalition would enhance the socialist' ability to pressure 
the bourgeoisie to begin transcending the . limits of a bourgeois 
revolution on the road toward a socialist revolution. In practical 
terms, the position led to three demands: that the soviet have the 
majority of ministers in the cabinet; that it pursue an aggressive 
"peace policy" (including publication of the secret treaties) and 
establish full government control over production, distribution, 
pricing, and profits; and that the soviet's support of the coalition 
cabinet be made conditional on the acceptance of this program.3 9 
It quickly became clear that Tsereteli's conception of coalition 
ensured a majority in the executive committee, made up of the 
Revolutionary Defensist bloc and the Populist-Defensists. Moreover, 
it was natural that the process of negotiations between the executive 
committee's delegation and the Provisional Government should result 
in a further dilution of the "May 2 Principles", championed by 
Tsereteli. It encouraged Skobelev to ask the Petrograd soviet on May 
5 (a few hours after the negotiations had ended and the new cabinet 
had been established) to approve the program and lend the 
government its "full confidence" and "complete authority."40 
There seemed to be nothing further in the way of coalition. 
The socialists felt reassured by Miliukov's resignation from the 
cabinet on May 2, which left the foreign affairs portfolio for 
Tereshchenko, while Kerenskii took over the Ministry of War and 
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Nekrasov the Ministry of Finance. With Skobelev as minister of 
labor, Chernov as minister of agriculture, and Tsereteli representing 
the soviet's general political line (his specific assignment was the 
Ministry· of Post and Telegraph), the executive committee felt that 
the new cabinet would be ·dedicated to the social and political 
democratization that they perceived as both the task of the 
revolution and a prerequisite for the government's stability. 4 1 
The workers' attitudes toward the new cabinet and their 
expectations of it were at odds with the interpretation of the 
executive committee because not many workers shared Tsereteli's 
trust in the progressive bourgeoisie. The typical resolution at these 
meetings alluded only to the socialist ministers. For example, that 
adopted by the workers of the Russian Society of Telegraph and 
Telephone on May 10 declared, "As long as you, comrades, are in the 
government, we are convinced that all its activity is directed toward 
the further strengthening of the revolution's achievements ... 4 2 
The workers' interpretation of coalition, then, was closer to the 
Internationalist' than to Tsereteli's. Their sense of economic injustice 
was beginning to grow again toward the end of April, with rising 
food prices and the demand that workers contribute to the Freedom 
Loan. Also, the press campaign in late March against democracy and 
the Kadet demonstrations of April 21 had reawakened the worker's 
suspicion of counterrevolution, as shown by their sudden organizing 
of "Red Guard" detachments in the factories, as the Bolsheviks had 
been demanding for some time (unsuccessfully up to this point).4 3 
Thus, while the workers had observed the restrictions of dual 
power, 44 they also sought to exercise greater kontrol' over the 
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government. It was for this reason that they viewed the prospect of 
socialists joining the government as something of a triumph. 
The next concern of the Menshevik leaders of the soviet in 
early May was for the response of their own party. The first 
nationwide Menshevik gathering since the revolution was scheduled 
to meet just two days after the coalition government had been 
' 
formed and approved by the soviet. 
The All-Russian Conference of the RSDRP (Mensheviks) opened 
on May 7 with the customary series of reports and congratulatory 
speeches. As new ministers and "respected leaders," Tsereteli and 
Skobelev addressed the conference and used the opportunity to 
defend the decision on coalition.45 Cautiously and systematically, 
Tsereteli presented coalition not as part of his strategy for uniting 
the "vital forces" but as the only alternative · to the assumption of full 
power by the soviet and for this reason as a "tremendous victory for 
the realistic tacticsn- Menshevism "has always championed."46 After 
strong arguments against the coalition by extreme internationalists 
Larin and Peletskii, the resolution, expressing strong support of 
coalition,was passed by a vote of fifty-one to twelve (with eight 
abstentions). No sooner had it been adopted than a supplementary 
resolution from the floor was proposed, and accepted, which stressed 
the need for a strong government and condemned anyone who 
discredited the present cabinet, especially its socialist ministers.4 7 
The debate on the question of the war followed much the same 
pattern. Dan spoke for the organizational committee; many 
amendments from the floor were proposed, and the final resolution 
was considerably more "defensist" than were most of the 
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Revolutionary Defensists in Petrograd. Not only did this resolution 
call for the defense of the country until a universal, "democratic" 
peace had been secured, but it also described the goal of peace as one 
that was fully acceptable to the new cabinet and added a sharply 
worded condemnation of fraternization on the front. Again, a strong 
vote in favor of the resolution (fifty-three to ten) was immediately 
followed by an amendment offered from the floor and adopted that 
specifically mentioned the need to preserve the army's fighting 
capacity and made defense a "national task" transcending "class 
lines. "48 Thus, by the time the returning Internationalist leaders, 
Martov and akselrod (who were the strongest opponents of any war 
efforts and coalition) appeared before the conference, on the evening 
of May 9, the two most important issues had already been settled 
and Revolutionary Defensism had been recognized as the party's 
strategy. 
Naturally, the conference did not avoid inner quarrels. Years of 
fragmentation had left the party divided, and the different ways in 
which the revolution was experienced by Mensheviks in the capital, 
the provinces, and emigration accentuated the elements that each of 
these groups chose from the common legacy of party ideology. The 
depth of these divisions became apparent during the conference's 
last session in a variety of ways: the newly arrived men (with the 
exception of Akselrod) were denied seats on the organizational 
committee; the Internationalists' announcement (in the name of the 
seventeen voting delegates) that they could not be responsible for 
policies they felt were "contradictory to the vital interests of the 
proletariat" evoked shouts of "Disgrace!" from the floor; and finally, 
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when Martov took the rostrum to read a note from Akselrod, he was 
met by the pounding of desktops and shouts of"We don't want to 
listen to him!" and "Down with him!"4 9 
Claims of ideological purity and of responsible realism clashed 
and hatreds flared at the May conference, yet the party did not split 
apart largely because among the veterans of Menshevism there was 
a desire for unity on all sides: on the part of those Revolutionary 
Defensists who had been close to Martov and Akselrod in the past, 
and on the part of the two Internationalist leaders who at least 
wanted to win back their "lost" comrades.5 0 Both factions even 
managed to agree on a resolution regarding the forthcoming socialist 
conferences on peace.51 
The Mensheviks party had given its blessing to the decision of 
the executive committee of the Petrograd soviet to establish a 
coalition government with the bourgeois parties of Russia. The 
decision was a momentous one: the two opposing camps of Russian 
society had formally declared their intention of working together 
toward the survival and transformation of the country; they had 
agreed to join in the military defense of the country from German 
aggression; and the Social Democratic leaders of the soviet, by ending 
their abstention from formal state power, had broken with their own 
ideology that had failed to predict the course of the revolution, let 
alone prescribe an appropriate political strategy; as the month of 
May began, then, the question before the Menshevik leaders of the 
soviet concerned the extent to which they would actually use the 
new possibilities, and this question subsumed others: How broadly 
would they define the social transformation possible at that state of 
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the revolution? How would they respond to their followers' 
aspirations and demands? How ready were they to risk the collapse 
of this new political agreement with the bourgeoisie should it prove 
to constrain unduly the freedom of Social Democracy? 
CHAPTERN .. 
IRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTIONS OF Tiffi COALffiON 
Radicalization of Petrograd Workers and Mensheviks' Response to it 
During the first two months of coalition, significant shifts of 
attitudes occurred among the workers in Petrograd regarding their 
employers, the propertied classes in general, and the strategy of 
cooperation between democracy and the bourgeoisie. To be sure, 
workers did not express their attitudes clearly or consistently, and 
the collapse of earlier expectations during the summer months left 
the Petrograd working class more politically fragmented than it had 
been since the start of the . revolution.! Nevertheless, the daily 
experience of workers, . shaped by the interconnected processes of 
economic ruin and intensified industrial conflict, did not accord with 
their initial expectations of the revolution or the hopes that had 
animated their support for the socialists' participation m 
government. Increasingly, workers blamed the frustration of their 
material goals, even the economic crisis itself, on their employers and 
came to doubt the wisdom of cooperating with them at all. 
Moreover, the continued participation of the moderate socialists in a 
coalition government that had failed to meet the workers' 
expectations and, more specifically, the Mensheviks' opposition to 
measures the workers considered essential to their own survival 
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workers' control' and the freedom to strike for higher wages --
created tensions between the Revolutionary Defensist leaders of the 
soviet and their Petro grad constituency. This estrangement led a 
growing number of workers to reject the moderates' advice, first on 
matters pertaining to factory life, then on. the political shape of the 
revolution. 
The most overt stgn of this change was the willingness of 
certain groups of workers to embrace Lenin's ·slogan of "All Power to 
the Soviets." 
An analysis of the elections in May of delegates to the district 
and city soviets and to the district dumas in Petrograd shows a shift 
in workers' support from the moderate socialist parties to the 
Internationalist parties in general and the Bolsheviks in particular. 
The political fragmentation of the Petrograd working class, the 
difficulty in interpreting the political behavior of workers, and the 
undisputable fact of a growing radicalism among them were all 
demonstrated in the outcome of the elections to the twelve district 
dumas of Petrograd, held in the last days of May and the first week 
of June. In general, the vote gave the Revolutionary Defensist bloc a 
comfortable majority: of the 784,910 votes (nearly 75 percent of all 
eligible voters), the moderate Socialists received 56.0 percent; the 
Kadets and other nonsocialists, 21.9 percent; and the Bolsheviks, 20.4 
percent. But there were sharp variations from one district to 
another. it was again in the Vyborg and Vasileostrov districts that 
the Bolsheviks scored their greatest success, with 58.2 and 34.3 
percent of the vote, respectively, compared to the moderates' 34.9 
and 45.2.2 In contrast, the Mensheviks, who had always courted the 
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support of the more skilled, literate, and politicized workers 
(generally the metalworkers and printers), now found their 
Revolutionary Defensist bloc supported largely by the less skilled, 
less politicized constituency of the SRs. 
Of the highly skilled groups whom the Mensheviks viewed as 
their natural constituency, only the printers still showed solid 
support for the Revolutionary Defensists and their coalition strategy. 
Otherwise, the Menshevik party was fast becoming a party of the 
radical urban intelligentsia. 
How did the soviet leaders react on the election results? None 
of the newspaper articles reporting the elections analyzed the 
reasons for the relatively strong Bolshevik showing in the Vyborg, 
Vasileostrov, and Petrograd districts. Instead, they hailed the results 
as a great victory for the Revolutionary Defensist bloc and as 
approval of its policies.3 Insofar as the Revolutionary Defensists 
admitted that there was reason to be concerned, they explained it in 
ways that did not call for a reconsideration of their policies. For 
example, Tsereteli said that, although Bolshevik influence had 
penetrated the sphere of "economic struggle," the Petro grad workers 
still wholeheartedly supported the "democratic socialism" of the 
moderates in regard to ,"general political questions. "4 Tsereteli's 
disregard for the changing mood of the soviet's constituency was 
symptomatic of how removed the cabinet men had grown from the 
soviet. 
The situation was very different for those Revolutionary 
Defensists outside the government who made themselves the 
defenders of coalition before audiences of workers and soldiers. 
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Years later, Voitinskii wrote Tsereteli expressing astonishment that 
the same events could have appeared so differently in their 
respective memoirs. Voitinskii's explanation for the discrepancy 
centered on the two men's different activities: "You made policy, 
whereas I was one of those who personally confronted the waves of 
hostility. "5 
Yet even in retrospect, Voitinskii was confident that the 
Revolutionary Defensists had been right in not changing their 
strategy in response to the expressions of opposition from the 
workers, for he believed that the real problem had lain in the 
expectation of"miracles" with which the "raw, ignorant" masses had 
welcomed the revolution: "The utopian maximalism of the lower 
classes vs. the real achievements attained by democratic means --
this was the essence of the split between the workers and the 
soldiers of Petrograd and the leaders of the soviet's majority. "6 
According to both Tsereteli and Voitinskii, the gap could have been 
closed by a better, more forceful implementation of the strategy of 
cooperation and moderation. 
In short, the Revolutionary Defensist strategy was based on the 
belief that there was no contradiction between the interests of the 
revolution and those of the proletariat. It was in this frame of mind 
that the Revolutionary Defensists awaited the opening of the first 
congress of soviets. 
The First Congress of Soviets (June 3 - 17) 
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The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened in Petrograd 
on June 3. In attendance were 1,090 delegates, representing some 
four hundred organizations with approximately twenty million 
members.? From the outset, this "congress of democracy" was firmly 
in the hands of the Revolutionary Defensist bloc. Not only could the 
Menshevik and SR factions count on 571 of the 822 voting delegates, 
but within the Menshevik faction the Revolutionary Defensist 
leadership was supported by the provincial delegates and could 
effectively neutralize the more radical Petro grad section of the party. 
The delegates to the congress consisted of two fairly distinctive 
groups, each with its own reasons for accepting the leadership's 
political course. The first and larger group was that of the army 
delegates, drawn in most cases from the soldiers' committees, army 
soviets, and mixed soldier-worker soviets. 8 Among these delegates, 
the patriotic mood of March had survived intact and perhaps even 
had solidified as the committees had been repeatedly called on by 
the command to stop the disintegration of military authority and to 
slow down the spread of antiwar sentiment among the soldiery.9 
The second group, more important in terms of the stable 
(though also largely passive) support it gave to the Revolutionary 
Defensists, was that of the delegates from provincial town soviets, 
most of whom were Mensheviks. They still felt that, along with 
other groups of the democratic intelligentsia, they were responsible 
for uniting the nation's forces. For these delegates, the congress, with 
the divisions that were apparent within it and with its vocal 
contingent of Bolsheviks, as well as the chaos of Petrograd, provided 
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an almost unbearable contrast to the virtual unanimity still 
prevalent among the intelligentsia in their provincial towns.l 0 
Given these two groups of supporters, there was little doubt of 
the outcome of the congress's first and most crucial debate, on 
relationships with the Provisional Government, nor was there 
anything new in the speeches of either detractors or defenders. The 
long debate (some sixty, speeches delivered over five days) included 
strong denunciations of coalition by the Bolsheviks and Menshevik 
Internationalists: Lenin demanded a transfer of all power to the 
workers and poor peasants, and Martov called more vaguely for an 
immediate end to socialist participation in coalition as well as a more 
energetic pursuit of the soviet's program.ll Tsereteli and the other 
socialist ministers treated coalition as an irrefutable fact and ignored 
all opposition to it. 
Coalition defenders spoke of its achievements to date and 
described the "objective" reasons for its short-comings. Tsereteli's 
only rebuke was directed at the "anarchism" in Kronstadt during 
April and May, and he used it to reassert the need for a "strong 
government" and for the unity of "all the vital forces of the 
nation."12 On June 8, the congress passed the Revolutionary 
Defensist resolution on this question by a resounding majority (543 
to 126). The resolution limited the expression of confidence to the 
socialist ministers alone but did extend the congress's support to the 
government's policy. The outcome of this debate, encouraged the 
Revolutionary Defensist leaders in their conviction that 
"revolutionary democracy" supported their strategy of coalition. 
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But soon it had become clear that the Bolsheviks intended to 
call for a massive demonstration against the coalition government on 
June lOth. Whether or not the demonstration had been calculated to 
lead to a takeover of power, the Bolshevik slogans represented an 
assault on the authority of the soviet's leadership.l3 
The congress united around an appeal to the workers to ignore 
the planned demonstrations and indeed to avoid all demonstrations 
for the next three days. "Let the Leninists be as alone on the streets 
as they are in the congress," Rabochaia gazeta pleaded.14 The appeal 
was widely accepted by workers and soldiers in all but the Vyborg 
and Vasileostrov districts, where about half of the workers rejected 
it or accepted it reluctantly. At the last minute, however, the 
Bolshevik Central Committee itself called off Ule planned 
demonstration.15 Thus, although this incident concerned only the 
soviet's authority, not its policies, it served to reinforce the majority's 
confidence. 
Tsereteli and his supporters, perce1vmg a threat from both the 
mounting wave of anarchy and the Bolsheviks' presumed conspiracy 
to seize power, attempted to "expel" the Bolsheviks from 
revolutionary democracy .16 Tsereteli demanded a change away 
from "verbal methods of struggle" against the Bolsheviks toward 
stronger measures, albeit still consistent with the preservation of law 
and order; specifically, he wanted the soviet to act on behalf of the 
minister of war, Kerenskii, to disarm , all military units that had 
supported the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks, he argued, had turned 
against the revolution and its democratic order and should be fought 
without regard . for one's "revolutionary emotionalism." 1 7 
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This demand provoked the first open conflict between Tsereteli 
and Dan. During a meeting of the star chamber and other 
Revolutionary Defensist members of the congress's presidium early 
on the morning of June 11, Dan launched a strenuous attack against 
Tsereteli and his supporters (Liber, Ermolaev, and Gots), and their 
proposals were defeated.1 8 
It concerned the permissible scope of action revolutionary 
democracy could take against its lapsed members. Whereas Tsereteli 
wanted the Bolsheviks expelled as a party and singled out for 
repression -- a task that would have fallen to the soviet -- Dan 
preferred "democracy" to maintain its unity and discipline through 
moral authority alone and to leave to the government the task of 
punishing those individuals guilty of illegal conduct. 
In Tsereteli's view, cooperation of the vital forces of the nation 
required the elimination of Bolshevism from the ranks of the truly 
democratic part of "revolutionary democracy." To him, the incident 
of June 10 was a good opportunity for effecting this necessary break. 
From Dan's point of view, revolutionary democracy was supposed to 
implement the revolution; Bolshevik "adventurism" was abhorrent to 
him and his supporters because it threatened to divide the "family of 
revolutionary democracy," but Tsereteli's proposed measures for 
dealing with the Bolsheviks were equally abhorrent, for the same 
reason.19 
The effect of Bolshevik challenge can be seen most clearly in 
Cherevanin's analysis. The Bolsheviks, he argued, knew that Russia 
was not ready for socialism, yet they had tried to prevent a 
bourgeois-democratic order from being established because their 
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real goal of international socialist revolution depended on a socialist 
revolution taking place first in Russia. Cherevanin had no doubt of 
the outcome of such a willful distortion of history's prescribed path; 
it would simply facilitate the coming of the counterrevolution.2 0 
During the debate on June 11 concerning the Bolshevik 
demonstration, Martov warned that nay measures taken against the 
Bolsheviks would only further alienate the "more active part of the 
I 
proletariat" and argues that the attitudes expressed by the 
Bolsheviks were in fact typical of a "huge mass" of workers. Dan 
answered with typical Revolutionary Defensist confidence that the 
"true will" of the laboring masses was expressed in the Congress of 
Soviets and not in the actions of one or another segment of the 
Petrograd proletariat. Then Dan boldly repeated a suggestion that 
had been made on June 9 by the Menshevik Petrograd organization: 
that the congress organize a mass political demonstration of all the 
soviet's parties to show support for the leadership's strategy, which 
the delegates had already so overwhelmingly approved.2 1 
Tsereteli and Liber registered the only reservations concerning 
the proposed demonstration, and they did so only because Bolshevik 
participation in the united venture would have obscured their 
standing as outcasts from revolutionary democracy.22 As it turned 
out, the demonstration, which took place on June 18, did not resolve 
the question of the political attitudes of the Petrograd workers. The 
Bolshevik newspaper boasted that the demonstration had revealed 
"the overwhelming majority" of the industrial proletariat of the 
capital and its troops to have been "behind the slogans of the 
Bolshevik party," for the greater number of banners had borne the 
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slogans of the Bolsheviks and not those of the soviet: "Armistice 
Now!" "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers!," and "All Power to 
the Soviets!"23 This fact suggested to the Internationalists that a 
reconsideration of political strategy was in order. The Revolutionary 
Defensists, however, chose to concentrate on the demonstration's 
other aspect: its support for the soviet and the marchers' apparent 
belief that they and their leaders were united behind the same goals. 
According to the Petro grad soviet's newspaper, the 
"divergence" ,, exposed during the congress between "a well-known 
section of the Petrograd proletariat" and the rest of democracy had 
actually served the leadership's cause, for it had reminded those in 
Petrograd of the "concrete correlation of forces existing in the 
country. "24 It was considered to be of great significance that the 
congress had created a new entity, the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee (VTsiK), which was invested with supreme authority over 
revolutionary democracy and thereby institutionalized the 
superiority of the provinces over Petrograd. In the VTsiK that was 
elected on June 17, Mensheviks held 104 of the 257 seats and SRs 
100, for a total of almost 80 percent. All told, the Revolutionary 
Defensist emerged from the First Congress of Soviets confident of the 
support of the soviet's followers for their political strategy. 
Meanwhile, the fundamental shift of attitudes among the 
soviet's followers in Petrograd, which had been in progress since late 
May, accelerated and reached a turning point. Several events 
contributed to this shift during the two weeks following the June 18 
demonstration. The first of these was the government's attack on the 
Anarchists occupying Durnovo's dacha (on the night following the 
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demonstration of June 18), which strengthened the Vyborg workers' 
hostility toward coalition.25 The second was Skobelev's appeal on 
June 28 for self-restraint, amidst economic crisis and an escalating 
industrial conflict. Finally, the beginning of the Russian summer 
offensive against the Germans on June 18, and its complete failure 
over the following weeks, was perhaps most, decisive. 
The Jun~ Military Offensive 
In late June as in late April, the issues of war, peace, and 
defense provided a convergence for the antigovernment sentiment 
among the soviet's followers. These were certainly crucial issues for 
the soldiers not only on the front but also in the rear garrison units, 
which could be called to battle at any moment. And the soldiers' 
point of view affected that of the workers, especially in urban 
settings, where the interaction between factories and barracks was 
most direct. In addition, the workers were receptive to the 
Bolsheviks' identification of domestic "capitalism" and international 
"imperialism." By the end of June, many workers on Petrograd had 
come to see the Menshevik policy on war and peace as a "blow to the 
Russian revolution and the International. "2 6 
Yet the chance to influence government policy in behalf' of a 
just peace among the warring countries had been one of the reasons 
for the Revolutionary Defensists' participation in the government. 
Indeed, they had spared no e:pergy during their first six weeks in the 
coalition in pursuit of this goai.2 7 In addition, through the agency of 
the soviet, they pressed for the convocation of an international 
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socialist conference that would unite all the socialist parties that 
were not blamed for "defeatism" in their respective countries, in an 
effort to force their governments to negotiate on the basis of the 
soviet's formula for a "democratic peace." Meanwhile, in the 
Provisional Government, they sought to direct Tereshchenko, the new 
minister of foreign affairs, to compel the French and British 
governments to change the Allies' declared war aims. Neither of 
these efforts bore fruit, but it was not because of inaction on the part 
of the Revolutionary Defensists. 
The first problem with the proposed socialist peace conference 
emerged during visits of the leaders of the European socialist parties 
to Petrograd: They could not be made to understand how urgent 
peace was for revolutionary Russia.28 Then, while the Revolutionary 
Defensists were nevertheless making preparations for the conference 
(which was to be held in Stockholm at the end of June), there cam 
the second blow -- the refusal of the French, ltalia1,, -:md U.S. 
governments to grant passports to their socialist delegates.29 The 
difficulties in implementing the other part of the Revolutionary 
Defensist peace strategy were also created by the Allied 
governments, not by the moderate socialists or the Provisional 
Government. Tereshchenko's first diplomatic initiative was an 
invitation to the Allies to join a conference of a review of the war 
aims, presumably with the goal of preparing to negotiate peace 
without annexations or indemnities. 
But unfortunately', Russia's financial dependence on the Allies 
left the Provisional Government with no further resort when they 
refused to consider any revision of the war aims. 3 0 
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In the light of these failures, the Revolutionary Defensists' 
dedication to peace appeared unconvincing. They were angered by 
the Allies' stubbornness, and they admitted that only an 
"international struggle of democracy against world imperialism" 
could overcome it.3 1 Yet they did not call on the Russian masses to 
launch this struggle with demonstrations or with fraternization and a 
nonbelligerent stance on the front, nor could such a strategy have 
been expected to convince the socialist parties in the Allied nations. 
Instead, the Revolutionary Defensists urged workers and soldiers to 
show their "determination to fight," arguing, first, that such 
determination would give the Germans a reason to negotiate, and 
later, that such determination would enable the Russian revolution to 
claim that it had "carried the banner of the struggle for peace" and 
would gain the support of the Allies socialist parties for peace 
negotiations.32 With these arguments, the Revolutionary Defensists 
sought to justify their support of the Provisional Government's 
decision, taken under British and French pressure, to launch the 
offensive against the German army. 3 3 
Not only was there a touch of the absurd in the launching of a 
military offensive in the name of peace, but also the validity of its 
expectations should have been doubtful from the outset. The 
Revolutionary Defensists, as the Bolsheviks would do after October, 
exaggerated the influence of the revolution beyond Russia's borders, 
even among the socialist parties. They also underestimated the 
depth of the disruption it would cause in the army. These 
misperceptions obscured the fact that the only practical choice was 
between continued war and a separate peace with Germany.3 4 
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Moreover, the issues of war and peace were often confused with 
considerations of the revolution's political arrangements. Both a 
separate peace and the vaguer variant of an "immediate armistice" 
advocated by the Menshevik Internationalists were objectionable to 
the Revolutionary Defensists principally because they feared that 
either one would destroy the "unity of the vital forces ... 3 5 In fact, 
the nonso~ialist ministers, especially Tershchenko and Kerenskii, had 
used this concern of the Revolutionary Defensists to pressure them 
into supporting the offensive.3 6 Had they been free of these 
considerations, they would have seen that the balance of forces had 
urgently dictated an end to the war. But in the time of late May and 
June, Kerenskii's campaign for "prosecuting the war in order to end 
it" seemed more promising a policy than that of suing for peace.3 7 
The offensive tested the reality of both the renewed optimism 
about the army's capacity to fight and the hope for diplomatic gain 
from the mere search for peace. An initial flush of success and the 
growth of patriotic feelings among certain groups of workers as well 
as among the middle class and the intelligentsia gave rise to some 
enthusiastic rhetoric amo1,1g the Revolutionary Defensists.3 8 The 
offensive, they insisted, had been only a "strategy" subordinated to 
the revolution's "political tasks," specifically to its "peace policy." 3 9 
Furthermore, they repeatedly attacked Potresov and his colleagues at 
Den' for their unreserved delight in the offensive.4 0 
Early success, however, soon turned to defeat, and whatever 
enthusiasm the offensive had aroused among the soviet's followers 
vanished. There were reports of soldiers refusing to fight, deserting 
their units, rand even assaulting one-popular emissaries of the soviet. 
81 
N.D. Sokolov, who had drawn up Order No. 1 was one of those beaten 
by soldiers for his support of the offensive. In Petrograd, the 
antiwar antigovernment mood spread quickly from units intended 
for the front to the garrison at large and finally to the workers.4 1 
The Revolutionary Defensists' reaction to this turn in popular 
sentiment was not to admit their mistake but to attack the 
Bolsheviks.42 Whatever the Menshevik interpretation of the causes, 
the offensive had clearly become the symbol of what workers and 
soldiers in Petrograd believed to have been the government's 
duplicity and the moderates' acquiescence in it. The political 
consequences of this mistake would be reaped during the so-called 
July Days. 
CHAPTERV 
JULY CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
July Days 
The political cns1s that took place in early July disclosed the 
mam antagonism of the Revolution and plunged Russia into the state 
when the previous -- peaceful -- ways of development were closed 
and the political leaders of both camps had to seek new radical 
solutions. 
Two crises which started in early July independently of each 
other resolved through nearly the same set of developments. One 
crisis involved the relations between the soviet's leadership and its 
followers, who poured into the streets of Petrograd on July 3 and 4 to 
express their desire for a bold new political initiative by the soviet. 
The other crisis involved the relations between the representatives 
of the soviet in the coalition government and the nonsocialist 
ministers, especially those of the Kadet party. 
The cabinet crisis began a day before the street demonstration, 
when the Kadet Central Committee decided to withdraw its four 
ministers from the cabinet on July 2, ostensibly to protest the 
agreement on limited autonomy for the Ukraine just negotiated by 
Tsereteli, Kerenskii, and Tereshchenko between the Provisional 
Government and the Ukrainian Central Rada.l The agreement, it 
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asserted, had violated two basic Kadet principles: the absolute unity 
of the Russian state and the equally absolute right of a future 
Constituent Assembly to determine Russia's political future. The 
refusal of the negotiating triumvirate to make any changes infuriated 
many other Kadets. More broadly, however, the agreement was final 
proof to the Kadets of the coalition's general uselessness.2 
The Kadet's resignation allowed the Revolutionary Defensists to 
recogmze more openly that their initial program had not been 
carried out. They now felt free to rededicate themselves to the 
implementation of this program, which in fact served as the basis of 
agreement among the members of the star chamber when they met 
on the morning of July 3 to discuss a solution to the crisis. The 
coalition, without the Kadets, it was decided, would co-opt "those 
representatives of 'bourgeois democracy' who would not be against 
the implementation of , the radical democratic reforms promised in 
the (May 6) declaration. "3 
On the afternoon of July 3, a combined meeting of the bureaus 
of the two all-Russian executive committees (that of the Soviet of 
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and that of the Peasants' Soviet), 
began to discuss the crisis. But before the two bureaus could make 
any decisions, news came of unrest among the workers and soldiers 
of Petrograd, throwing the political tactics and the parliamentary 
manipulations of the Revolutionary Defensist leaders into disarray. 
The street demonstrations by workers and soldiers proved the most 
damaging to the Revolutionary Defensists' strategy. In retrospect, 
the demonstrations appear to have been the culmination of a ,process 
of embitterment and political radicalization that had been under way 
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for most of the two months of coalition and that had accelerated with 
the offensive. Demonstrations were largely spontaneous, they began 
on the orders of the Bolsheviks (whose Central Committee had in fact 
first attempted to dissuade workers from demonstrating) nor 
primarily concerned with the resignation of the Kadet ministers.4 
The first call to workers and soldiers to demonstrate against 
the government came on July 3 from the First Machine Gun 
Regiment, stationed in Vyborg, after it had elected a "revolutionary 
committee" to plan the takeover of certain points in the capital in 
conjunction with the demonstrations. The regiment had a long 
history of contact with the Bolshevik military organization, and 
activists from that organization and from the Ararchist Communists 
were among the leaders of the insurrection. The machine-gunners' 
action followed two weeks of agitation and turmoil triggered by an 
order on June 20 th~t part of the regiment move to the front.5 
In other units and factories in the Vyborg district, and later all 
over the city to which emissaries from the Machine Gun Regiment 
were sent with word of the planned demonstration, they found most 
workers and a large part of the soldiers eager to listen and follow. 
The most dramatic response came from the Putilov workers. There, 
news of the Kadets' resignation had arrived on July 3 and had served 
to give clearer political definition to the workers' anger, which had 
been mounting during their month-long wage dispute with the 
Provisional Government. Thirty thousand Putilov workers responded 
to the summons with an armed march on the Tauride Palace to 
demand that the soviet assume "full power. "6 When they reached 
the Tauride Palace in the small hours of the morning of July 4, they 
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joined the huge crowd that had already gathered in front of the 
gates, carrying banners of all sorts (many of them probably left over 
from June 18), exclaiming, among other things, "Down with All the 
Capitalist Ministers" and "All Power to the Soviets!"? 
After two months of coalition, ·the workers no longer believed 
that the soviet could force the bourgeois ministers to do its will. 
Indeed, the issue was not really "soviet power" as such but rather 
the workers' desire to see realized the soviet's policies of peace, 
economic reconstruction, and democratization (to which the soldiers 
added the distribution of land) as well as their desire that their 
leaders acknowledge that these policies would not be realized in 
coalition: 
Our comrades, the socialist ministers, entered into 
an agreement with the capitalists. But those capitalists 
are our sworn enemies. We demand that the land be 
seized imm£·.·e~iately, and that a struggle be initiated 
immediately against the hunger that threatens us.8 
What worker's frustration, even hostility toward formerly 
admired leaders was forcefully demonstrated in the episode, in 
which a fist-waving worker shouted at Chernov, "Take power, you 
son of a bitch, when it's being handed to you! n9 
The workers' new political mood did not change the 
leadership's strategy, though it affected their handling of the crisis in 
a number of important ways. First, the demonstrations had the 
effect of dividing society in Petrograd and isolating its working class. 
On July 3, and even more so on July 4, when more workers as well as 
twenty thousand Kronstadt sailors joined the demonstrations, armed 
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confrontations took place between the radicalized soviet's 
constituency and the supporters of the Provisional Government 
which resulted in some four hundred deaths and revived earlier 
fears of civil war .I 0 Second, the workers' behavior was viewed by 
most Revolutionary Defensists as symptomatic of their political 
immaturity. and strengthened the Revolutionary Defensists' 
determination to resist the pressure for a more radical policy .1 1 
Finally, the Bolsheviks' involvement in the July Days deflected the 
Mensheviks' attention from the c.hange in working-class sentiment in 
Petro grad. After initially discouraging the demonstrations, the 
Bolshevik Central Committee yielded to the pressure of events and of 
the party's lower ranks and on July 4 issued an invitation to all 
workers and soldiers to exploit the cabinet crisis and press for soviet 
power .12 As a result of these three factors, the street demonstrations 
of July 3 and 4 had the seemingly paradoxical effect of reinforcing 
the resolve of the Revolutionary Defensist leaders to see the coalition 
revived. 
The soviet leaders were faced with options: to insist on the 
principle of coalition, perhaps modified as a result of the cabinet 
crisis or to create a new political arrangement based on either soviet 
power or something else. The choice among these options was 
arguably the most crucial decision of the eight months between 
February and October. In the atmosphere of fear of an outbreak of 
civil war and of anger toward the Bolsheviks and their followers, the 
political divisions in the soviet and within the Menshevik party 
became sharper. 
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The meeting of the executive committees ended early on the 
morning of July 4 with only an appeal to the workers and soldiers to 
end the street demonstrations, with further debate postponed until 
another meeting at six that evening.13 When the committees 
reconvened, it was apparent that the Bolsheviks and Left SRs were 
no longer the only advocates of soviet power. To most 
Internationalists, both Menshevik and Independent, the second, and 
more serious, day of demonstrations and unchecked clashes was 
proof that a radical departure from the strategy of coalition was 
urgently required, both because this was the demand of the soviet's 
constituency and because it seemed the only way to prevent further 
bloodshed. Steklov, formerly an Independent SD but now affiliated 
with the Menshevik Internationalists, argued that a "socialist 
ministry" not only had been essential but also had been met with an 
"enthusiasm greater than that which had greeted the overthrow of 
the Romanov dynasty." The Menshevik Internationalists Kapelinskii 
and Lapinskii agreed; the latter declared that "any other solution 
would condemn the country to a state of chronic crisis. "1 4 
It was Martov who offered the most innovative solution, 
another alternative. He had condemned coalition and had rejected a 
policy of soviet power for the same doctrinal reason: socialists should 
not hold political power in a revolution that could not accomplish a 
socialist transformation in the short run. Over the last two months, 
however, he had seen two long-standing threats to the revolution 
being realized: the bourgeoisie's refusal to "complete' the democratic 
revolution (now irrefutably shown in the Kadets' resignations) and 
the bourgeoisie's distortion of the policies of their socialist coalition 
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partners in an effort to deprive them of the workers' support. He 
was now convinced that none of the traditional Menshevik 
arguments against the soviets' assumption of full power could 
outweigh the message of the demonstrators. I 5 
Martov proposed, then, a 'purely democratic' government 
organized and dominated by the soviet (perhaps with a minority of 
nonsocialist democrats) and dedicated to a program of radical 
reforms: an immediate armistice and the democratization of the 
army; a struggle against counterrevolution, including a purge of all 
governmental agencies; the immediate preparation of agrarian 
reforms that would include the confiscation and redistribution of all 
large land holdings, subject t0 the approval of the Constituent 
Assembly; and extensive economic changes, such as new tax 
measures, central economic planning and regulation, and the 
sequestration of any plant shut down by the owners. This was a 
preview of the strategy of a "homogeneous socialist government" 
that is, a government drawn from among all the socialist parties 
represented in the soviets, which would be the principal alternative 
to coalition during the next few months. I 6 
But Dan's and Tsereteli's speeches that night did not betray a 
lessening of confidence in the correctness and feasibility of their own 
strategy. First, they pointed out that troops "loyal to the revolution" 
were on their way from the front to petrograd and could physically 
deflect the pressure from the demonstrators. Second, they argued 
that the preconditions for support of the coalition by the two camps 
still existed. As Tsereteli said: 
The coalition does not mean a bloc with the Kadets 
alone, and their departure does not mean that a bloc is 
impossible. We form blocs not with parties but with all 
those who are ready to stand on our platform. I 7 
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In the short run, the Revolutionary Defensists' confidence 
proved will founded. When Dan and Tsereteli had finished their 
speeches, at about 1 A.M., the debate had been on for seven hours. 
The executive committees began to vote on resolutions. The 
resolution submitted by the Revolutionary Defensists won easily over 
that of Martov. 
The second resolution recognized the reduced cabinet as the 
legitimate governmental authority and consigned a comprehensive 
discussion of political strategy to a plenary meeting of the All-
Russian Central Executive Committee scheduled to meet in Petrograd 
two weeks later.l8 The meeting finally adjourned at 4 A.M on July 
4. The members of the star chamber were now free to dedicate their 
energies to repairing the damage done by the Kadets to the unity of 
the "vital forces" and to fulfill their promises. 
The soviet leaders' confidence in their confrontation with the 
Petrograd demonstrators was based on the presumed support of 
revolutionary democracy outside the capital. By early July, however, 
that support was rapidly declining at the fronts and in the industrial 
villages and towns of the central industrial region -- a trend that was 
apparently underestimated by the Revolutionary Defensists in 
Petro grad. The workers' sense of alienation from the soviet's 
leadership made them more perceptible to the political alternative 
formulated by the Bolsheviks. The July days deepened the split 
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within the Menshevik party, the summoning of loyal troops and, 
later, the measures against the Bolsheviks and their supporters 
would end any hope of a timely reconciliation between the 
Revolutionary Defensist leadership and the Internationalist wing led 
by Martov who strongly opposed the application of punitive 
measures against workers and soldiers. He viewed their excesses as 
the acts of misguided revolutionaries, not of criminals. I 9 
In the short run, the outcome of the July Days was a 
Revolutionary Defensist victory over the opponents of coalition. But 
it was a shaky victory, and one built entirely on the premise that a 
new, more democratic coalition could be formed and be rededicated 
to the reforms demanded by the soviet's constituency. 
-The Immediate Political Results of the July Days and the 
Mensheviks' Response to Them 
From the July Days the political arena of the revolution was 
dominated by two alternatives, both of them hostile to coalition, and 
though they developed simultaneously and fed on each other, one 
can view them as played out in succession. The first of these was a 
right-wing dictatorship, which followed directly from the repressive 
measures taken against the Bolsheviks and their supporters in the 
wake of the July Days and ended in General Kornilov's attempted 
coup at the end of August. The second was a left-wing dictatorship 
of the soviet, advocated by the Bolsheviks since April but made far 
more plausible after Kornilov's failed adventure. These two 
alternatives, and the Mensheviks' response to them, will be 
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examined below. Before considering the second alternative, we will 
examine the social aspect of industrial relations between July and 
October, for without this dimension the workers' ultimate support for 
the Bolshevik seizure of power could not be explained. 
By the end of July, the Revolutionary Defensists revealed their 
inability to appreciate how deeply the July Days had diminished the 
chances of accommodation between Russia's major social groups. 
Between July and October, the Menshevik leaders would find their 
overtures repeatedly rebuffed not only by their own constituency 
but also by the groups whom then considered the natural allies of 
revolutionary democracy. Cabinet crisis, disorder and a 
counterrevolutionary backlash directed against the Bolsheviks, 
against the workers in Petrograd, and indeed against the whole of 
revolutionary democracy. In Petro grad, bands of armed sailors from 
Kronstadt, prevented by government forces from returning to their 
base, continued to roam the streets, while in other parts of the city 
Bolsheviks and workers were arrested and lynched.20 From the 
front, too, there was bad news: a German breakthrough in the 
Russian defenses at Tarnopol along the Galician front, and 
demoralization and mass desertion.21 Meanwhile, it was becoming 
apparent that measures introduced in the army (with the 
Revolutionary Defensists' consent) to combat desertion and antiwar 
propaganda were being used against the soldiers' democratic 
organizations. These measures included the reinstitution of the 
death penalty, military censorship, and a ban on political 
association.22 
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The problem, Tsereteli explained to an emergency session of 
the VTslk on July 17, was how to "strike at anarchy without striking 
at the revolution itself" that Is, how to ensure that the 
"revolutionary order" not e used by the "counterrevolution" to 
undermine the organizational strength of the soviet. His and the SRs' 
argument was that anarchy was the greatest danger -- that, infact, 
anarchy and counterrevolution "fed on each other" to the extent that 
the Provisional Government had to be given "unlimited powers" to 
fight anarchy"in all its manifestations.2 3 
The problem of Revolutionary Defensist strategy after the July 
Days, however, consisted not only of the need to balance the 
concurrent campaigns against anarchy and counterrevolution but 
also of the recognition that repressive measures alone could not be 
expected to stem the tide of disorder. That goal required the 
satisfaction of at ~{":>st the most pressing of the workers' and soldiers' 
demands. In the days following the crisis, Rabochaia gazeta 
repeatedly called for making the program of "radical democratic 
reforms" the centerpiece of negotiations in the cabinet's 
reconstruction.24 Such programs, drafted by Dan, was placed by the 
Revolutionary Defensist leaders before the executive committee on 
July 7. and accepted by it and then adopted by the Menshevik 
Organizational Committee.25 It admitted that the use of repressive 
measures containe(l, the risk of counterrevolution, but it blamedthe 
need for them on the Bolsheviks' "adventurist attempt at armed 
action" against the Provisional Government. On the other hand, it 
asserted that continued "revolutionary order" made necessary a 
series of steps, including the elimination of all "remnants" of the old 
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regime; a declaration that Russia was a democratic republic; 
"immediate measures" in regard to the agrarian and labor questions; 
the development of self-government; the regulation of economic life, 
especially in the area of supplies; and the convocation of the 
Constituent Assembly without delay.26 The program called for the 
most far-reaching domestic reforms that- could reasonably be 
expected before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, though 
the issue of war or peace was intentionally left vague. 
Soviet leaders' commitment to radical change was tempered by 
a search for agreement with other elements of educated Russia. But 
could a broad coalition be formed around. the soviet's program? Now 
it contained the additional demand that the Duma be immediately 
dissolved. Prince L'vov rejected the attempt to "dictate" to the 
government and announced his resignation.27 Not only did his 
resignation exemphl'y the widening rupture between democracy and 
the moderate liberals but in practical terms it meant that the new 
prime minister would be Kerenskii, whom none of the Mensheviks 
trusted. In any case, the cabinet accepted the soviet's program on 
July 8. This apparent victory allowed the Revolutionary Defensists to 
grant the government with "unlimited power" for the "salvation of 
the revolution."28 But this "solution" of the crisis did not work. The 
events of the July Days, and the subsequent general disorder, had 
given political shape to the sense of injury, and self-righteousness 
that the propertied and educated groups had increasingly felt over 
the past two months. 
The public and commercial-industrial organizations gave free 
rein to their attacks both on the workers' specific demands and on 
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the soviet as an institution. The Provisional Committee of the Duma 
described the soviet as a "socialist minority" seeking to subordinate 
the cabinet, and Riabushinskii described it as "a casual gathering of 
people, for the most part ignorant, nameless unenlightened, 
irresponsible . . . ' 
construction. n29 
and unprepared to participate m state and social 
The Petrograd-based Union of Trade and Industry 
said the coalition cabinet was comprised of one wing (the socialist) 
that would not yield on its "narrowly partisan goals" and another 
(the nonsocialist) that had no real support among the "influential 
circles" of the country .3 0 The general opinion of industrialists 
seemed to be that the government should break with the soviets. 
Now, most of those who wrote and spoke for the propertied 
groups projected an image of Russian society as irrevocably divided 
between men of education and responsibility and an anarchic mob 
whose demands -- and nay concession to them -- would destroy the 
country. In these circumstances, even Nekrasov and Tci~::,hchenko, 
Tsereteli's strongest bourgeois supporters, began insisting that no 
reform be attempted by the cabinet until it could secure the support 
and participation of at least the more influential parties and 
organizations of the propertied classes.31 Moreover, the socialist 
ministers were forced to give Kerenskii a free hand in negotiating the 
terms of such participation. When negotiations for a new coalition 
began on July 13 the Kadets and the commercial-industrial 
organizations were dictating to the soviet the limits of its influence 
on government policy.3 2 
The rejection of the July 8 program by the Kadets and the 
industrialists did not prevent the star chamber from attempting to 
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implement it. Having secured the approval of the Petrograd 
executive committee and the VTsiK for a new coalition that would be 
prepared to carry out "radical democratic reforms," would be 
invested with "broad powers," and would be based on all the "vital 
forces of the country,"33 they proceeded to persuade Kerenskii to 
initiate the formation of the kind of cabinet 'demanded by the soviet. 
The result was a decisive blow to Tsereteli's hopes. 
On July 20, Kerenskii wrote to the Kadet negotiators to explain 
that any new government would have to be guided by the principles 
of all three programs adopted by previous cabinets, those of March 2, 
May 6, and July 8. The Kadets promptly informed Kerenskii that 
they would not join such a government. Kerenskii resigned and left 
for Finland in a huff.3 4 This was followed by the resignation of all 
the nonsocialist ministers, and Russia found itself without a 
government.35 On July 21, the Revolutionary Defensist leaders 
convened the VTsiK to announce their decision to enter immediately 
into direct negotiations .. with all of the "big parties" except the 
Bolsheviks and the Octobrists.3 6 
At the meeting with the "big parties," the soviet's 
representatives -- Tsereteli, Dan, Chkeidze, and Liber -- encountered 
unanimous rejection of their attempts to dictate the government's 
policies.37 After a heated discussion Dan threatened a soviet 
seizure of power, but in vain. Finally, the official Menshevik 
response invited Kerenskii to return and form a cabinet of all parties 
ready to work under him as prime minister .3 8 
The cabinet established by Kerenskii on July 23 was the first to 
have come into being without a declaration of intentions, except that 
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the ministers were "responsible to their consciences alone.3 9 
Judging only from its composition, the new cabinet could not have 
been pronounced as dedicated to the program of social and political 
democratization that had been the declared goal of the three 
preceding cabinets in revolutionary Russia. The socialists were now 
a small minority, five out of fifteen ministers, and no longer included 
Tsereteli, the voice of Revolutionary Defensism and the soviet. 40 To 
the soviet's followers, the participation of socialists in this coalition 
must have seemed a considerable concession to the right, though this 
was not how the Revolutionary Defensists saw matters. 
Of all the Revolutionary Defensists, Tsereteli was the most 
honest about the impossibility of reconciling the tasks of reform and 
cooperation and the need to sacrifice the former to the latter. In 
presenting the new government to the VTsiK on July 24, he warned 
that now the sov-iet should avoid any "interference" with the 
government's acts, be they social reforms or additional rncasures of 
repression. Ideologically speaking, the compromise with the 
nonsocialists was a "lesser evil" when compared to the alternative of 
a government of the soviets that was isolated from Russia's 
propertied and "intermediate" classes.41 
What made other Mensheviks, hitherto unenthusiastic about 
the prospects of national coalition, hold on to it so desperately now 
was the rising specter of a counter revolutionary backlash, or, as 
formulated by the Internationalist Martynov (a consistent critic of 
coalition), the existence of only two alternatives in the aftermath of 
the July Days: that of a "premature attempt to realize socialism" and 
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that of "reaction" -- and even the former was likely to lead to the 
latter. 4 2 
August Conferences 
Antisoviet and antisocialist feelings of the propertied classes of 
Russia found an open expression at three big conferences that met m 
Moscow during August: the Second Trade-Industrial Congress 
(August 3 - 5); the Conference of Public Activists (August 8 - 10); 
and the State Conference (August 12 - 14). At the Conference of 
Public Activists, only a few of the speakers rejected the charge that 
the country's troubles were solely the fault of the socialists and the 
lower classes,43 most of the other speakers, however, directed bitter 
complaints at the soviets, the soldiers' committees the workers' and 
employees' committees, and even Tereshchenko and Kerenskii whose 
indulgence toward socialist "dilettantes" was blamed for the 
desperate situation in the army, the railroads, industry, finance, and 
food supplies.44 Moreover, they generally agreed on the necessity of 
a strong, authoritative government (meaning a government without 
socialists), and many called for a halt to all social reforms and the 
establishment of a military dictatorship. 4 5 
What was significant in this regard was that, alongside 
supporters of the old regime from among the landed nobility and the 
clergy, the conference had attracted representatives of the Union of 
Engineers, the Union of Junior University Instructors, the cooperative 
movement, and the Peasants' Union -- that is, those groups that the 
Mensheviks had identified as rural and urban democracy. 
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Shortly afterward, the antisoviet mood of the bourgeoisie 
proper manifested itself at the State Conference, the largest of the 
revolution's gatherings. This conference, attended by 2,500 
delegates representing every social, professional, national, and 
political group, was meant to le,nd an appearance of unity and 
support to the Kerenskii reg1me. Its effect, however, was to show 
how little authority the coalition government had among the mass 
following of revolutionary democracy and how mistrustful of its 
ability to maintain order were such elements of census society as the 
army commanders and the leaders of the Kadet party. Disregarding 
the advice of the soviet, Moscow's workers went on strike and 
demonstrated against the conference m numbers not seen smce 
February, while inside the conference hall General Kornilov's call for 
"urgent" measures to restore order at the front and the rear (by 
extending the death penalty to the whole country) was greeted with 
applause.46 In general, the nonsocialist speakers, though 
disagreeing among themselves on almost every program discussed at 
the conference, followed the example of the Conference of Public 
Activists in devoting their statements to attacks on the socialists. To 
these accusations Dan, Chkheidze and Tsereteli answered that the 
revolutionary regime needed to implement measures for both social 
improvement and economic recovery, but they also indicated the 
soviet's readiness to accommodate census Russia's concern for law 
and order in the army and throughout the country.4 7 
Finally, and only after long negotiations, the constituent 
elements of nonsoviet democracy -- the cooperatives, city dumas, 
and zemstvos -- were persuaded to subscribe to what came to be 
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known later as the August 14 program. yet neither the 
manifestations of national responsibility nor the parliamentary 
success of forming a "democratic front" could overcome the 
belligerent determination of the bourgeoisie for a radical political 
solution. The State Conference was an omen of Kornilov's attack on 
the Provisional Governmen.t two weeks later. 
It was again time for the Revolutionary Defensists to reconsider 
their coalition strategy, and the Unification Congress of Russian Social 
Democracy (in fact, of the Menshevik party), which opened in 
Petrograd on August 19, provided the· opportunity, though in the end 
produced neither unity nor a clearer political direction. Instead, the 
debates underscored the party's splintering and the estrangement 
among its many factions and groups. On the extreme left was the 
group of former Independent Internationalists identified with the 
newspaper N ovaia zhizn'. Together with them, forming an 
Internationalist faction, was Martov's group of Internationalist 
emigres, who were far closer to the traditions of Menshevism but no 
less extreme m their denunciation of coalition.48 Close to them in 
opinion, though not in practice, were the Internationalist-Unifiers, 
praktiki from Moscow, Tula, Odessa, and Tver, whose 
Internationalism and critique of coalition were tempered by 
emphasis on the party's unity and by the fact that they often voted 
with the Revolutionary Defensists. At the center of the party stood 
the Revolutionary Defensist leadership, which for months had been 
carrying both the burden and the prestige of coalition negotiations 
and government work. To the right of the Revolutionary Defensists 
were most of the provincial Mensheviks, whose "statesmanlike" 
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concerns, born of governing Russia's localities and of their leadership 
of the provincial intelligentsia, were deepened in July by the 
precipitous rise in Bolshevik influence among the workers. Finally, 
on the extreme right and largely excluded from the party's work 
during 1917, stood the Defensist Potresov, whose gloomy projections 
now closely resembled those of the provincials. 
Tsereteli's boastful optimism sharply contrasted to Potresov's 
profound pessimism about the proletariat's failure to "rise to the 
challenge of the all-national tasks." B ogdanov and Liber, like 
Tsereteli, warned against making the Social Democratic program of 
domestic reform too "radical". But the Internationalists Martov, 
Avilov, Semkovskii, and I.S. Astrov all called on Social Democrats to 
leave the coalition government which exposed its 
counterrevolutionary nature, and make themselves the leaders of 
whichever elements (democratic as well as proletarian) could be won 
to a program of radical domestic and international policy.49 With 
opinions divided so sharply it was not surprising that the outcome 
was essentially a stalemate. The strategy of coalition did win 
majority approval, with 115 votes in favor, compared to 79 for 
Martov's position and 9 for' Potresov's. But with the exception of 
Tsereteli, no one professed enthusiasm for it, and the congress itself 
offered no solution to the difficulties the Revolutionary Defensism. 
Even the Internationalists appeared reluctant to advocate the 
solution of a ''homogeneous socialist government," for which Martov 
had called during the July Days, in part because they had been 
repeatedly reminded of the dangers of isolation, defeat, and eventual 
counterrevolution. Indeed, the Bolsheviks' growing strength in the 
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soviets and the likelihood of their manipulating a purely socialist 
government made these dangers seem even more real. 
Two weeks after the State Conference closed, General Kornilov 
attempted a coup against the Kerenskii government. During those 
two weeks, a sense of impending disaster spread among all groups, 
which seemed to call for the most decisive measures. The economy 
took a turn for the worse; there was a haunting fear of renewed 
disorder in the cities; and with the fall of Riga on August 19, the 
German army came a step closer to Petrograd. A variety of 
nonsocialist organizations began planning for a radical shift in the 
nature of the provisional regime so as to be able to use the power of 
the state to curb the autonomy of revolutionary democracy -- which 
they blamed for the disastrous conditions in the country -- and to 
exclude it from organized participation in Russia's political life. 
The web of conspiracy, misapprehension, and incompetence 
that brought about the Kornilov affair has been recounted elsewhere 
and need not be repeated here.5 0 Whatever the intentions of those 
involved in it -- a military coup against the Provisional Government 
itself or military support for a move by the government against the 
soviets, the soldiers' committees, and other "self-appointed 
organizations" -- the goal uniting them was the political exclusion of 
the left.5 1 
The discovery of Kornilov's · actions by a supposedly surprised 
Kerenskii on the night between August 26 and 27 produced a flurry 
of defensive activity by the soviet's supporters in Petrograd and on 
the railroads leading to the capital, and undermined the readiness of 
most soldiers in Kornilov's forces to carry out the ordered march on 
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Petrograd. The coup attempt was quickly put down, but its very 
occurrence changed the political choices facing the Menshevik 
leaders in significant ways, closing off some possibilities and 
seemingly opened others. 
Coalition with the Kadets or the other elements of census 
society implicated in the Kornilov affair, now became impossible. 
Instead, the Mensheviks decided to combine the nonsocialist 
democratic groups with socialist revolutionary-democratic ones into 
a "homogeneous democratic government." Of course, the degree of 
social and political fragmentation so clearly reflected in the July 
Days, the State Conference, and the Kornilov affair made it unlikely 
that the amorphous elements of democracy would break their ties to 
the census groups and align themselves with the socialists. 
Moreover, the lessons of Kornilov's assault on the soviets might lead 
workers and soldiers to a new surge of militancy and vindicate the 
Bolshevik view of Russian society and politics. The story of this final, 
tragic defeat of the moderates' strategy for the revolution must be 
viewed in the context of an unchecked economic crisis, a relentless 
industrial conflict, and the precipitous decline in the functioning of 
the state itself. It is to these aspects of the revolution's last months 
that we now turn. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FALL OF MENSHEVISM 
Collapse of the Economy, its Causes and Results 
After a brief improvement in March and April, prompted by 
revolutionary patriotism and the dynamics of improved relations 
between labor and management, the production and supply of key 
products began declining again in May and June. Then, between July 
and October, a precipitous economic deterioration became evident 
from the growing number of closed factories and of temporary or 
terminal layoffs and the increase in unemployment. Although the 
situation in all these areas would become far worse after the 
Bolshevik seizure of power in October, both workers and employers 
felt the state of industry in the la:te summer and fall of 1917 was 
indeed one of "crisis." 
The economic crisis of late summer was caused in part by the 
general problems. The inability of Russian industry and economic 
infrastructures (especially rail transport) to meet the requirements 
of a prolonged war; the imbalance created by the channeling of all 
available resources into military production and related branches of 
industry; and in 1917, the impact of the revolution in undermining 
entrepreneurial confidence, in confusing lines of administrative 
103 
104 
oversight, and in failing to establish a more effective regulatory 
system. Beyond these general causes, however, several new 
developments exacerbated the economic difficulties and the societal 
antagonisms. In late summer, the railroads faced the added tasks of 
transporting multitudes of soldiers leaving the front and making the 
seasonal shift from the light summer load (when river transport was 
possible and heating fuel was not needed) to the usually heavy fall 
and winter load. According to one report, only 50 percent of the 
railroad's rolling stock was in operation in late July, and fuel reserves 
were down to a one-week supply for industry and a two-week 
supply for the railroads) 
Another new phenomenon was the disastrous state of the 
treasury and financial markets. In the stock exchanges of Petrograd 
and Moscow, a veritable orgy of buying and selling stocks was taking 
place, which a financial journal attributed to the unscrupulous 
willingness of banks and entrepreneurs to benefit from the naivete 
of people wishing to invest their rapidly devaluating monetary notes 
in property they considered safe.2 
Additional difficulties affected the supply of food to the 
industrial centers -- a matter of immense political importance in the 
fall of 1917, as it had been the previous fall. Besides the problems in 
transporting grain from the countryside to the cities, there were few 
industrial goods to exchange for the grain, which prompted a major 
banking organization to recommend the armed requisitioning of 
grain .3 Moreover, the state grain monopoly disrupted the old 
networks of grain purchasing, but the new public and state organs 
were as yet poorly organized and generally unable to obtain the 
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necessary operating capital. 4 The banks and commercial 
organizations began to condition credit to these organs on certain 
governmental concessions, and such conditions led to the 
government's decision on August 27 to double bread prices a~d to 
allow private merchants to participate in grain purchasing alongside 
the cooperatives.5 
Underlying the government's inability to regulate economic 
activity was its failure to forge an authoritative national regime. As 
the gap between social groups widened, the workers' and 
industrialists' perceptions of what was the state's appropriate role 
drew further and further apart. The workers demanded more state 
intervention and the takeover of privately owned plants and 
eventually of the whole economy. Meanwhile, private entrepreneurs 
began to view even the most circumspect regulation by the state as 
illegitimate intervention and to question the right of the 
intelligentsia in the economic ministries to exercise state power for 
which they were "unfit. "6 
At the State Conference, the Menshevik leaders of the soviet 
made a last, though cautious, effort to save both the economy and the 
coalition. Chkheidze presented a program of economic measures in 
the name of "united revolutionary democracy" that barely exceeded 
what had already been done and in some cases constituted a retreat: 
for example, in the implementation of a state monopoly on grains 
and other essential items he now saw a place of individual 
merchants.? But even this modes program was unacceptable to the 
representatives of commercial-industrial organizations, who were 
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hoping at the time that the country's social and economic problems 
might find resolution in Kornilov's "strong hand." 
After Kornilov's defeat, this hope was dashed, and as the 
disintegration of the state apparatus became more obvious than 
ever before, entrepreneurial organizations seemed disoriented, and 
their actions were often contradictory. Some intensified their 
demand to be completely free of state interference. On September 5, 
the newly established All-Russian Union of Societies of Industrialists 
adopted a resolution declaring that the distribution of raw materials 
should be placed under its purview, because the government was too 
ineffective. 8 
However, other entrepreneurs, under the leadership of 
Konovalov, who returned to the Ministry of Trade and Industry m 
the coalition of September 25, seem to have concluded that a crisis 
might not work to their advantage and that whatever state authority 
still remained should be utilized to avert an impending catastrophe. 
But their concessions came too late, were too meager, and involved 
too much sacrifice on the workers' part to be credible. A declaration 
of intended policies published by the government on September 25 
projected the continuation of state controls on certain pnces, wages, 
and work time. 
Altogether, the commercial-industrial interests emerge here as 
bearing the greatest share of responsibility for the regime's failure to 
regulate the country's economy, yet they commonly saw themselves 
as victims.9 
Confrontations had by now become the declared strategy of the 
Moscow industrialists, both those led by Riabushinskii in the All-
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Russian Trade-Industrial Union and those led by Guzhon in the 
Moscow Society of Industrialists (MSI). At the Second Trade-
Industrial Congress, Riabushinskii had used the archaic appellation 
"trading men" (liudi torgovye) to rally his fellow entrepreneurs to 
the organizational work that would put them m a position to exploit 
the approaching economic "catastrophe." 10 In summing up the 
congress, a Menshevik newspaper had declared that the assembled 
merchants and industrialists had exhibited an "exclusiveness and 
intolerance" worthy of the Bolsheviks: they "did not grieve over the 
grave condition of the motherland but gloated over the mistakes of 
the Provisional Government." 1 1 
Indeed, Riabushinskii seemed to be deliberately courting 
catastrophe in the hope that its outcome, "the bony hand of hunger," 
would teach the workers and members of "committees and soviets" 
the lesson of submission to the "state interest" as defined by the 
commercial-industrial class. Meanwhile, the Moscow-based Union 
and the MSI were making every effort to restrain the government's 
I 
regulatory efforts, to enforce on their member enterprises a strict 
code of resistance to worker's demands, and to undermine labor's 
strength by provoking lengthy strikes or locking the workers out.1 2 
An even sharper shift in strategy, especially in regard to 
labor's demands, occurred during July and August among the 
industrialists of the south who demanded that troops be sent to the 
Donbas mines to protect property and production.13 Some 
industrialists did everything they could to break the workers' 
organizations: mechanize production, hire foreign workers, and shift 
from domestic production to imports.14 For the men entrusted with 
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maintaining a semblance of industrial order, the period after the July 
Days was one of enormous pressures. The Mensheviks in the 
Ministry of Labor were often called on by other government agencies 
to intervene in industrial conflicts.15 Yet they found their mediation 
efforts snubbed or denounced by both workers and employers, as 
happened in the conflict in Moscow's leather industry, which had 
begun in mid-July and remained unresolved on October 25.16 
Although the ministry in numerous instances supported the 
workers' specific demands, the economic difficulties forced it to insist 
-- as did other government agencies -- that employers not grant 
wages higher than the state recommended, because that would 
trigger similar demands from the workers of other factories and 
cause a further depletion of the treasury or new industrial 
conflicts.17 It is easy to appreciate how disappointed the workers 
were with the mh.,istry's attempts to hold down wages. Indeed, the 
work , of the Mensheviks in the Ministry of Labor during the final 
weeks of the Provisional Government, however well intended, seems 
to have only further discredited them among both workers and 
industrialists. 
The workers were of course directly affected by the economic 
deterioration and the industrial conflicts. Inflation, particularly the 
steep rise in the cost of food that followed the August 27 doubling of 
grain prices, considerably diminished real wages.18 Unemployment, 
too, was becoming a more widespread source of anxiety, because it 
now affected not only the seasonal construction and wood workers, 
and unskilled workers, but the relatively privileged metalworkers as 
wen.19 The industrialists' aggressive posture after July had raised 
-----
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the workers' mistrust to new heights, while the government's failure 
to deal with either the causes or the symptoms of economic 
deterioration had forced workers to rely more on themselves, 
turning to their usual weapons - strikes. 
Though the proportion of economic strikes ending in full or 
partial satisfaction of the workers' demands declined precipitously 
between July and October,20 strike activity only rose. The strikers' 
persistence, as measured in the length of strikes, increased, even 
though the strikes were taking place in conditions of grave economic 
difficulty. 21 In short, a major characteristic of the strike movement, 
when it revived in late July and August, was that workers often 
struck simply in protest and without hope of immediate success. 
Strikes for better conditions undertaken in the knowledge that they 
were hopeless reflected an alienation from the existing order and a 
determination to destroy it. 
In August, September, a9-d October, the incidence of workers' 
intervention in the economic functions of management, including the 
(usually temporary) takeover of enterprises, rose rapidly m 
Petrograd. One source estimates that, by October, some form of 
workers' kontrol' was operative tn ninety-six enterprises m 
Petrograd, which together employed nearly 300,000 workers -- i.e., 
approximately three-quarters of the city's industrial work force, 
most of it employed in large metalfinishing factories.22 This 
increase in intervention was chiefly the result of workers' desperate 
efforts to defend their jobs, though the owners may have perceived 
it as impermissible aggressiveness. 
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The Revolutionary Defensists did themselves great damage by 
attacking the work of the factory committees. Under pressure from 
the industrialists and concerned about falling productivity, Skobelev 
issued two circulars: one on August 22 reminding the members of 
factory committees that their competence did not include matters of 
production (disagreements with management over such matters had 
to be referred to the regional factory conferences), and the second on 
August 28 condemning the practice of conducting the committees' 
affairs during working time.23 These pronouncements reinforced 
the workers' sense of alienation from the moderate socialists in the 
government, because they were issued at the very time that workers 
felt compelled to expand the purview of the committees. The 
episode gave workers another reason for disregarding the moderates' 
advice and following the Bolsheviks.24 
By the second half of August, the Bolsheviks appeared to have 
recovered from the July debacle and to be increasing their strength 
among Petrograd's workers. They captured 33 percent of the vote in 
the elections to the city duma on August 20 (compared to 20 percent 
in early June); they did particularly well in the working-class 
districts, winning absolute majorities in Vyborg and Peterhof.2 5 
Most district soviets had by then declared their opposition to the 
moderates, as had the Interdistrict Conference of Petrograd Soviets, 
which had become the radical counterpart of the Pet:rograd soviet.2 6 
Similarly, among the trade unions of the capital only the printers and 
paperworkers remained loyal to the Mensheviks, so that the 
Bolsheviks now held seventeen of the twenty-four seats on the 
Petrograd Trade Union CounciL27 Finally, among members of the 
1 1 1 
factory committee there was nearly unanimous support for the 
Bolsheviks. In some, the more active, better-organized workers in 
Petrograd (and increasingly elsewhere) had replaced the moderates' 
vision of the revolution with one offered by the Bolsheviks. 
The Last Chance 
The failure of Kornilov's revolt drastically changed the political 
situation in Russia and forced the Mensheviks to reconsider again 
their position concerning the main questions the structure of 
power and ending the war. The new reality expressed itself in the 
rapid fall of the Kadets' prestige (who had discredited themselves by 
the ties with Kornilov), peoples' distrust of the idea of the coalition 
between socialists and liberals transition of the leadership in the 
Petrograd and Moscow soviets into the Bolsheviks' hands, withdrawal 
of the Mensheviks' leaders from the Petrograd soviet and 
concentration of their activity on the All-Russian Soviet and its 
executive committee -- VTsiK, a three-week governmental crisis and 
further loss of the control over economy as a result, and hence still 
further deepening of the antagonism between the workers and the 
bourgeoisie. 
What answer did the Mensheviks give to this challenge? On 
August 31 the Menshevik Central Committee adopted a resolution on 
exclusion of the Kadets from any future government. The same 
decision was approved by SRs' Central Committee on the next day. 
Thus, Tsereteli's strategy of coalition seemed to fail. 
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The next task standing in front of the Mensheviks was to find 
and implement another alternative to the governmental power. Two 
old alternatives were at their disposal. The first one that had been 
defended by the Bolsheviks since April constituted "the government 
of the soviet," which would actually function as a dictatorship of the 
proletariat and poor peasantry. This alternative scared both 
Menshevik factions (Defensists and Internationalists), and SRs as 
well, because it would lead (according to their predictions) to the 
final domination of Bolsheviks. 
The second old alternative that Martov had been proposing 
since July 3, consisted in the formation of a "homogeneous socialist 
government," which would include SRs, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. 
But this alternative also scared most of the socialists because it could 
strengthen the opposition not only from the propertied classes, but 
also from the workers and peasants. This could be explained by the 
fact that the socialists, even possessing entire power still could not 
satisfy the urgent needs of workers and peasants. 
Therefore the moderate socialists had to look for another, third 
alternative, which was worked out by VTsiK at the meeting of 
September 3, where Bogdanov was the main speaker: 
Some comrades raise the possibility at the present 
moment of a dictatorship of the poorest classes, i.e., the 
proletariat and the peasants. Those who speak of such a 
dictatorship . . . are following the course of the (Paris) 
Commune. Such a commune may be possible in 
Petrograd and in other cities but not in the rest of 
Russia. It will be crushed, by the vacillating elements 
that will join the bourgeois bloc. 
But there is another course the dictatorship of 
democracy, not of the soviets (alone) but of those 
democratic organizations whose cadres are working 
throughout the country, such as the cooperatives, the 
municipal dumas, and the new zemstvos . . . 
(The soviet) must immediately resolve that a 
congress of democratic organizations, municipal dumas, 
zemstvos, cooperatives, and so forth, be convoked in the 
nearest future, and this conference must decide the 
question of the organization of power.2 8 
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Bogdanov's "dictatorship of democracy," or, as it was better 
known in Dan's formulation, . a "homogeneous democratic 
government," would be a government in which the soviets would 
take the initiative but would still cooperate with the intermediary 
social groups and the democratic public and self-governing 
organizations, without which a soviet government would be 
politically isolated and administratively helpless.2 9 
This strategy became the party's official course in a resolution 
adopted at the September 1 meeting.30 But it remained to be seen 
whether "democracy" would agree to make a break with the Kadets 
and the organizations of census Russia. 
The Mensheviks' · hopes were dashed even before the 
Democratic Conference opened on September 14. The leading figures 
of nonsoviet democracy proved to be reluctant either to break with 
the political organizations of census Russia or to challenge these 
organizations by supporting the immediate implementation of the 
reforms called for by the August 14 program (to which the leaders 
had subscribed during the State Conference). At a meeting of the 
star chamber at Skobelev's apartment to which several of these 
figures had been invited -- V.V. Rudnev, the Right-SR and a member 
of the Central Union of Cooperatives; and the educator Dushkevich --
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"the idea of an all-democratic government was buried literally in ten 
minutes," as Dan later wrote, when the guests declared their refusal 
to join such a government and argued that it would not be acceptable 
to the population at large because it would only lead to anarchy and 
civil war.31 
A month later, speaking before an audience of Georgian Social 
Democrats in Tiflis, Tsereteli complained that the Russian democratic 
intelligentsia, "unlike that of Georgia," had proven incapable of 
fulfilling its role in the revolution and had left the leaders of the 
revolutionary democracy with the dismal choice of coalition or a 
soviet government.3 2 
In any event, the Democratic Conference foreclosed all hope the 
Mensheviks may still have had of averting a Bolshevik seizure of 
power ,33 At every level, the conference was divided nearly equally 
between supporters and opponents of coalition. The Menshevik 
faction first voted 59 to 55 in favor of coalition, then reversed itself 
(73 to 65 with 4 abstentions) after hearing Martov's and Zhordania's 
arguments m opposition and Tsereteli's defense.34 When the 
conference divided itself up on September 19 into "curias," which 
voted separately on the question of coalition, the results were just as 
confusing: the military organizations, peasants' soviets, and 
municipal self-governments voted by a slight majority for coalition; 
the cooperatives and the zemstvos favored coalition more decisively; 
but the workers' and soldiers' soviets and the trade unions rejected 
coalition solidly. The conference as a whole voted 766 to 688 (with 
38 abstentions) in favor of coalition, then amended its resolution to 
exclude those connected with Kornilov's conspiracy (798 to 139, with 
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196 abstentions); amended it a second time to exclude the Kadets 
explicitly (595 for the exclusion, 493 against, and 72 abstaining); and 
in the end voted to defeat the final resolution by 813 to 183, with 80 
abstentions) 5 
Hoping to break the deadlock, the Democratic Conference 
delegated the decision on a , political solution to an enlarged 
presidium, but its daylong meeting on September 20 also ended in 
near-deadlock: fifty votes for coalition, sixty against. The presidium 
did agree, however, that the new government should work for the 
realization of the August 14 program and be accountable to a 
permanent Democratic Council that the Democratic Conference was to 
select. The possibility of continued coalition was implied in the 
provision calling for the addition of, a bourgeois delegation to the new 
council, which would then become the Provisional Council of the 
Russian Republic, or Preparliament (Predparliament), if the new 
cabinet were joined by representatives of the propertied classes.3 6 
Yet the divided conference could not force even this modest program 
on Kerenskii, who saw the Kornilov affair as an opportunity to 
tighten his personal hold on the cabinet. In fact, exploiting the 
Kadet's departure, Kerenskii had already declared Russia a republic 
on September 1 and had thereby stolen the soviet's thunder. He also 
took the first step toward reconstructing the cabinet in a form 
opposed by the VTsiK; that is, by creating a plenipotentiary 
"directory" of five members.3 7 The, just as the Democratic 
Conference was getting under way, Kerenskii began negotiating the 
formation oa f new coalition in which the Kadets wer~ to be 
represented. When the moderate leaders of the VTsiK (Tsereteli, 
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Chkheidze, Gots, and Avksent'ev) joined the negotiations as 
representatives of the Democratic Conference, the minister-president 
closed ranks with the Kadets to force the socialists to give up the 
demand for government accountability to the Preparliament and 
accept the government's minimalist interpretation of the August 14 
program.3 8 
Whatever hopes had been raised by the unmasking of the 
counterrevolution in the Kornilov affair and the resulting initiative 
for a "homogeneous democratic government" had now been lost. But 
in refusing to submit to the Preparliament, Kerenskii's coalition had 
helped to further undermine the notion of a national revolutionary 
assembly -- already greatly weakened by the inconclusive results of 
the Democratic Conference -- through which contradictory social 
interests and conflicting visions of the revolution might have been at 
least partially reconciled and the revolution spared from a 
dictatorship of the right or left. 
The short history of the Preparliament demonstrated the 
futility of the concept underlying its existence. When it opened on 
September 23 as the Democratic Council, revolutionary democracy, 
with close to 200 of the 308 seats, had a comfortable numerical edge 
over nonsoviet democracy. However, when the Bolsheviks walked 
out, and when 156 representatives of census groups were added, 
what then became the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic 
was left almost evenly divided between the bourgeoisie, 
revolutionary democracy, and intermediary and indecisive 
democracy .39 The debate on national defense, which took up most 
of the Preparliament's time, did not produce a majority for any 
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resolution and proved all too clearly that no collaborative effort on 
behalf of the revolution's goals was now possible. Not surprisingly, 
the workers of Petrograd voted through their deputies in the 
Petrograd Soviet on October 9 to boycott the Preparliament.4 0 
Meanwhile, the cabinet that had refused to recognize the 
Preparliament's authority was itself unable to check the disorder and 
disintegration. There were strikes on the railroads and in the Donbas 
mines and the Baku oil fields; factory shutdowns in Petrograd; an 
uprising in the fleet; mass desertions from the front; and perhaps 
most serious, an almost complete breakdown of grain sales in the 
countryside. Moreover, as memories of the Kornilov fiasco receded 
and the extent of Bolshevik popularity and confidence became 
clearer, census Russia again seemed bent on a strategy of 
confrontation. At the Kadets' Tenth Congress in mid-October, 
Miliukov's conservative wing of the party reasserted its strength 
against the more conciliatory leaders such as Nabokov, N.M. Kishkin, 
M.S. Adzhemov, and the new Kadet industrialists Smirnov and 
Konovalov. 41 A second Conference of Public Activists met in Moscow 
in mid-October with the aim of "uniting all statesmanlike and 
nationally thinking" people for a "reaction against the revolutionary 
democratic organizations. "42 Indeed, there was talk in the halls of 
the Preparliament among delegates from the right of plans to exploit 
a Bolshevik attempt to seize power in order to rally the soldiers 
around the Provisional Government and enable it, where Kornilov 
had failed, to crush the organizations of the left. Small wonder that 
in this atmosphere the cabinet hardened its stand. The ministers 
including Kerenskii and Tereshchenko, declined even unofficial 
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contacts with the moderate leaders of the VTsiK; Tereshchenko, the 
minister of foreign affairs, now accepted the Kadet view of Russia's 
war aims; and General A.I. Verkhovskii, the minister of war, was 
summarily dismissed when he recommended to the Preparliament's 
Defense and Foreign Affairs committees that Russia enter into 
immediate peace negotiations to avoid military disaster. 4 3 
Thus, the hopeless situation that emerged after the failure of 
the Democratic Conference urgently demanded from the Mensheviks 
to abandon their strategy of preserving democracy through class 
cooperation. By the end of September the last opportunity to 
establish "the dictatorship of democracy" had been lost, and only two 
options remained -- either a proletariat or a bourgeois dictatorship. 
Unfortunately~ the Mensheviks stubbornly rejected these 
options. They preferred to criticize the left and right extremes. 
Dan's responses to the situation were emblematic of the 
Revolutionary Defensist approach, who illustrated the dilemma most 
vividly. On the one hand, he cautioned against "any careless step" by 
the soviets, for he was sure that would "kill the revolution," and in 
such times the duty of political parties was "not to follow the masses 
but to explain to them how disastrous was the road they wished to 
follow ... 44 On the other hand, although he supported Tsereteli's and 
Skobelev's contention that coalition was the only possible solution in 
the "tragic situation" created by the Democratic Conference, Dan and 
many praktiki also called on their party to voice its criticism of the 
new coalition openly. 4 5 
Only a week before the Bolshevik coup did the Revolutionary 
Defensists turn sharply to the left.' In his statements to the 
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Preparliament and its committees, Dan consistently pressed for 
government action on three points he considered essential in any 
effort to reclaim popular support for the regime: immediate peace 
talks; the transfer of all gentry-owned land to the land committees; 
and prompt convocation of the Constituent Assembly.46 On October 
24, a resolution on these points was narrowly approved by the 
Preparliament. 4 7 Dan improvised a "delegation" composed of 
himself, Gots, and the reluctant Avksent'ev,, who was serving as 
chairman of the Preparliament, in the hope of persuading the cabinet 
to take last-minute action in conformity with the resolution. It was a 
last, desperate effort to force a "break in the sentiment of the 
masses" and prevent their supporting the seizure of power being 
planned by the Bolsheviks. But the cabinet took just a few minutes 
to reject the appeal, and once again the Mensheviks had failed to 
save the revolution and their own moderate strategies from 
destruction at the hands of the forces tearing society apart. 4 8 
The Second Congress of Soviets 
From mid-October the question of the Provisional Government's 
existence actually had been decided in the Bolshevik party and in the 
soviets where the Bolsheviks held a majority. For the Revolutionary 
Defensists, October 25 was a day of double tragedy: first, because 
they were removed from the leadership of the soviets through the 
votes of workers and soldiers all over Russia; and second, because 
their political strategy was dealt a final blow when sailors and 
workers loyal to the Bolsheviks arrested the members of the 
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Provisional Government -- an act which the Mensheviks strongly 
believed would lead to civil war. When the Second Congress of 
Soviets opened on October 25, the Menshevik faction was the 
smallest of the three major socialist factions, with about 50 seats for 
the Revolutionary Defensists (including the Bund) and 33 for the 
Internationalists, compared to over 300 Bolshevik delegates and 
nearly 200 SRs, of whom more than half were Left Srs. According to 
the official proceedings, 505 delegates had come to the congress 
committed to vote of "all power to the soviets"; 86 for "all power to 
democracy"; and only 79 for a "coalition government," 21 of them for 
a "democratic coalition without the Kadets. "4 9 The soviets' 
constituency had turned decisively against the Revolutionary 
Defensist strategy of cooperation with the other elements of Russian 
society, and the congress's first act was to replace the Menshevik-SR 
presidium with a Bolshevik-Left SR one.50 Early on the morning of 
October 26, the Second Congress of Soviets declared the Provisional 
Government deposed and assumed full authority in the country. By 
the, the SRs and Mensheviks had left the hall; this historic 
declaration was passed by vote of the remaining delegates, with two 
objections and twelve abstentions.5 1 
On October 25 the Mensheviks made two statements. The first, 
made by Dan, said that a "homogeneous democratic government" was 
now an absolute necessity and should be established "immediately," 
presumably without waiting for the consent of democracy's more 
moderate elements.5 2 A second statement, more openly radical, 
was contained in Martov's address to the Second Congress, delivered 
shortly after it opened; he urged tha~ the fighting stop so that a civil 
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war might be avoided and that the Bolsheviks negotiate with all 
other socialist parties the formation of a "united democratic 
government" acceptable to the whole of democracy. (A few minutes 
later, when he spoke again in favor of his proposal, Martov used the 
term "revolutionary democracy. ")53 This was, in other words, a 
revival of the idea of a"homogeneous socialist government." 
Both statements suggested a remarkable departure from 
Revolutionary Defensist strategies during the past few months and 
could perhaps have affected the political outcome of the seizure of 
power even if the act itself could no longer be prevented.54 Indeed, 
Martov's speech was received enthusiastically by the delegates, 
many of whom were desperate to avoid a split in the soviets at this 
grave moment,5 5 and his proposals were even endorsed by 
Mstislavskii for the Left SRs and A.V. Lunacharskii for the 
Bolsheviks, and they were approved by the congress unanimously .5 6 
This unanimity, however, was deceptive. Within minutes of 
the vote on Martov's proposals, a series of Menshevik speakers 
(Ia.Ia. Kharash and Kuchin from the army and the Muscovite 
Khinchuk) accused the Bolsheviks of conspiring to deprive the 
congress and the Constituent Assembly of their powers, threatened 
to mobilize the army on the front against this "adventure," and called 
on the congress to negotiate with the Provisional Government the 
formation of a cabinet to represent all elements of democracy .57 
Then, having provoked an explosion of hostility and bitterness by 
their attack on the Bolsheviks and their opposition to the seizure of 
power, the Menshevik, SR, and Bund factions left the congress amid 
shouts of "Deserters!," "Kornilovites!," and "Good riddance!"58 But 
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the Menshevik Internationalists remained, and Martov placed before 
the congress a more precise and binding resolution calling on "rebel 
democracy" to negotiate with the rest of "democracy. "59 
It was at this juncture that Trotskii hurled his famous 
imprecation at the departing delegates, which would henceforth 
haunt the Mensheviks: "To those who have left and who tell us to do 
this we say: Your role is played out; go where you belong -- into the 
dustbin of history! "60 But perhaps more telling of the effect the 
Revolutionary Defensists' conduct had on the congress was 
Lunacharskii's pronouncement, for he had endorsed Martov's 
proposal earlier: "We all accepted Martov's proposal to discuss 
peaceful ways of solving the crisis . .. but a systematic attack was 
launched at us . . . Without hearing us out,without even discussing 
their own proposals, they immediately tried to separate themselves 
from us ... to isolate us."61 In any case, the Internationalists further 
obliged Trotskii when they, too, left the congress, and Martov's 
resolution was defeated. 6 2 
If their walkout was a tragic mistake, it should be remembered 
that even at that hour of misfortune they were resourceful enough to 
offer yet another heterodox solution: a socialist government 
committed to the broader aims of deQ}ocracy. Although the 
formulation of a "homogeneous socialist government" had been 
Martov's, the Menshevik faction's vote on the night of October 24 -25 
to press for such a government immediately indicated that many 
Revolutionary Defensists now accepted the necessity for some radical 
alternative to coalition. Here again, their motives had been derived 
only partially from ideology. On the night of October 25 - 26, it was 
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the sight of the radicalized delegates, the humiliation of being 
deposed once more by the Bolsheviks from the leadership of the 
working class, the realization of all the old suspicions about a 
Bolshevik "conspiracy" and "adventurism" -- all that was reminiscent 
' 
of the painful experiences of the past -- that stood as an obstacle to 
the working out of a compromise. Even Kinchuk, a frequent critic of 
coalition, could not leave the formation of a new government to this 
congress, and even Martov could not stomach the sight of Trotskii, 
triumphant and spiteful, on the rostrum. The Mensheviks had once 
again been defeated. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
What conclusions can be derived from the experience of the 
Russian Mensheviks? The Mensheviks were the most consistent and 
devoted democrats in Russia at that time. Despite their Marxist 
orientation (and, perhaps, thanks to it) they were neither fanatical 
nor dogmatic, but could flexibly adjust their program to the demands 
of the situation, without betraying their main principle -- the 
defense of working class interests. The Russian Mensheviks (or at 
least their central wing) were also real humanists, who consistently 
opposed not only wars (imperialistic or civil), but also any social or 
class violence, regarding both bourgeois and proletarian 
dictatorships. 
The weakness and downfall of the Mensheviks was the 
manifestation of not only the situation in Russia, but also evidence of 
the deep crisis of all European liberalism, and socialism as well. The 
defeat of the Mensheviks was the tragedy of both Russia and Europe, 
because the Bolshevik coup and communist totalitarian dictatorship 
which followed became one of the main sources for the emergence of 
fascist and totalitarian regimes in Europe, and finally the unleashing 
of World War II. 
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In what respect can we talk about the Mensheviks' guilt? Is it 
just to blame them for their refusal to support dictators (no matter 
from the right or from the left), seeking unlimited military power? 
History doesn't favor democrats or democracy in the 
circumstances of a civil (or any other) war. Therefore it was natural 
that the Mensheviks began to lose their influence on the eve of such 
a war, and disappeared as an independent political force in the 
course of it. (By the way, the same could be said about liberals and 
liberalism in Russia.) 
What historical lesson can be learned from the Russian 
catastrophe? Firstly, democracy is neither the highest nor the 
unconditional value; secondly, democracy cannot be introduced by 
somebody's will (even if this will is strengthened by a state power 
and considerable mass support, as it was in May of 1917); thirdly, 
democracy, in the genuine sense of the word, is cultivated over the 
space of many generations and can be rooted only under the 
appropriate economic, political and cultural conditions. None of such 
conditions existed in Russia. Therefore, in fact, the so called "period 
of democracy in Russia" (from February to October, 1917) is a myth. 
One should not call an elephant's trunk "an elephant". In the same 
way, it is a mistake to call the freedom of strikes, demonstrations 
and press - "democracy". The latter is an integrated social structure 
which includes a developed network of institutions, providing the 
rule of law, the protection of personal rights and social stability. 
The Mensheviks realized that socialism was impossible in the 
Russia of that time but they did not realize that in Russia there was 
no place for democracy as well. Their passionate dreams turned out 
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to be utopian, and any attempt to bring about a utopia leads to a 
catastrophe. And this is perhaps the most important lesson to be 
learned from the history of the Russian Social Democrats. 
This lesson remains extremely important today, but IS 
unfortunately underestimated, both in Russia and in the West. The 
speeches about the expanding democracy in today's Russia are 
nothing but self-deception or deliberate dishonesty. It is a utopian 
idea which in practice leads to a wrong and hence harmful 
orientation and program for reforms m Russia. The destruction of 
the Soviet state and governmental power, the collapse of economy, 
the disappearance of the remnants of morality, rapid social 
polarization and marginalization, followed by mutual hatred, the 
spread of organized crime and corruption, -- all this has nothing to 
do with democracy or with movement towards it. And all this takes 
place not because of the "bad leaders", but according to social laws 
inherent in Russian society itself. Today, as it was seventy-five 
years ago, the alternative is not "democracy or autocracy", but rather 
"prowestern dictatorship II or "Russian nationalistic dictatorship II. 
Such is the Russian fate. . . 
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